

The background of the cover is black, featuring a complex pattern of wavy, contour-like lines in shades of blue, yellow, and red. These lines flow across the page, creating a sense of movement and depth. Scattered throughout the design are numerous small squares in various colors: blue in the upper left, red in the lower left, yellow in the lower right, and a mix of green, yellow, and red in the upper right. The overall effect is a dynamic and layered visual texture.

Shining a Light on Internal Displacement

A Vision for the Future



**United
Nations**

UN Secretary-General's High-Level
Panel on Internal Displacement

**Report of the United Nations
Secretary-General's High-Level Panel
on Internal Displacement**

Shining a Light on Internal Displacement

A Vision for the Future

Report of the UN Secretary-General's
High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement

Report available at <https://internaldisplacement-panel.org>

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Foreword

We began our work as the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement at an inaugural meeting in February 2020 in Geneva, Switzerland. We did not know it at the time, but the world was about to change. Just days later, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic. To keep ourselves safe and protect our families, many of us were able to stay at home and limit our movements. For tens of millions of other people though, the risks posed by the virus were outweighed by the threats of war, violence and disasters, or a tragic combination of factors. For them, staying at home was not an option. Flight was the only way to find safety.

As we submit our report to Secretary-General António Guterres, the internal displacement crisis continues and even deepens. The title of the report – ‘Shining a Light on Internal Displacement: A Vision for the Future’ – reflects the two main preoccupations that drove our work. First, internal displacement has largely dropped off the international agenda over the past decade. Despite commitments to ‘leave no one behind’ as part of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are often invisible and marginalized at national, regional and international levels. Second, business as usual is patently not acceptable. Concrete and measurable improvements in prevention, response and solutions to internal displacement must be achieved.

We decided to focus, above all, on the millions of people trapped in protracted displacement and the imperative to help them find durable solutions. We dedicated our attention principally to contexts where the State has demonstrated a degree of willingness to address internal displacement. We strongly believe that by redoubling efforts to support solutions in such contexts, it is possible to achieve a breakthrough for millions of IDPs, host communities and displacement-affected nations. However, achieving this will require fundamental changes to the current approach to solutions. Among other elements, far greater emphasis has to be placed on working with and through Government systems to ensure that IDPs and host communities benefit from the protection and support of the State that is rightfully theirs.

Delivering on this approach calls for a change in mindset, working methods and institutional arrangements across both national and international actors. National ownership, responsibility and accountability must be brought to the forefront and States must recognize IDPs and host communities as rights-holding citizens and residents of their country. There is a need to go beyond addressing internal displacement as only a humanitarian crisis and understand that it is directly linked to broader challenges of governance, development, human rights and peace. It is also closely tied to the interconnected realities of climate change, urbanization and fragility. In this context, development, peace and disaster risk reduction actors must be engaged earlier, systematically and comprehensively, and much better use must also be made of the

capacities of the private sector and civil society. These efforts must draw on strong data and evidence. All of this requires adequate financing.

We strongly believe that this change in direction will have transformative effects for IDPs, displacement-affected communities and their countries. Progress on solutions will also free capacity and resources that are urgently needed for emergency situations. To truly address the full spectrum of displacement challenges, however, dedicated attention is also needed to strengthening prevention and improving protection and responses.

Making major improvements to the global internal displacement crisis will not be an easy task. Among the many challenges, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic continue to be felt and could push internal displacement even further down the list of global priorities. Galvanizing States, the United Nations, other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and international financial institutions to change their ways of working and address internal displacement as an urgent priority could become even more difficult.

Internal displacement is, however, too important to neglect. By working together and building momentum for change, the crisis can be overcome. IDPs, host communities and Governments must be able to count upon the steadfast commitment of the international community.

This report is the culmination of extensive consultations, inputs and deliberations. We are immensely grateful to all those who contributed to this effort. We extend our sincerest appreciation, first and foremost, to the IDPs and host community members who shared their experiences, challenges and aspirations with us. We are also grateful to the States, UN entities, NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, private sector leaders, representatives of international financial institutions, researchers and others who offered invaluable insights, analysis and recommendations. We thank Canada, Denmark, the European Union, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States for their contributions towards the financial requirements of the process. And, turning to the core team supporting the Panel's work, we are immensely indebted to our esteemed Expert Advisers who worked in close partnership with us throughout this process, and to the Panel's Secretariat for their tireless support.

To the United Nations Secretary-General, we are honoured that you entrusted us with such a profound responsibility. We hope that we have lived up to the expectations for this Panel and that our report helps to move the internal displacement issue – and above all the lives of the internally displaced – towards a better future.

Federica Mogherini, Co-Chair

Donald Kaberuka, Co-Chair

September 2021

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CHAPTER ONE

A Global Crisis

Neighbourhood destroyed by coalition airstrikes in the
Cratar neighbourhood of Aden, Yemen. November 2018.
Credit: OCHA/Giles Clarke

1. A Global Crisis

Every year, people around the world face the devastating impacts of conflicts, violence, disasters and climate change. Tens of millions of them flee their homes but never cross an international border. These individuals, known as internally displaced persons or 'IDPs', make up the vast majority of displaced people around the globe today.

At the end of 2020, a **staggering 55 million people** were living in internal displacement.¹ While some regions are affected more than others, no nation is spared from the risks of displacement. **Women and girls** make up over half of the world's IDPs,² 5 million IDPs are living with **disabilities**³ and an estimated 2.6 million are **elderly**.⁴ Over 30.5 million are **children and youth**.⁵

There can be no doubt: **this is a global crisis.**

It is a crisis defined by three compelling features. **First, there has been an unrelenting climb in**


the number of IDPs.⁶ While the historical data on disaster displacement is limited, the figures from conflict settings paint a stark picture: over the past two decades, the total number of people displaced internally by conflict and violence has more than doubled.⁷ The number at the end of 2020 – over 48 million – was the highest ever recorded.⁸

A primary reason for the growth in numbers is **new displacement** as millions of people are forced to flee their homes each year. There are a number of factors driving this trend. **Conflict and violence** continue to rage around the world, often leaving civilians with no choice but to flee to protect themselves and their families.⁹ **Disasters** and the **adverse effects of climate change** are another major driver and are responsible for the majority of new internal displacements each year.¹⁰ **Criminal and gang violence, persecution and human rights violations** and the effects of **development mega-projects**¹¹ all further contribute to

FIGURE 1

Total number of people internally displaced by conflict and violence by year

Source: IDMC



displacement and technological disasters, such as the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents, have also permanently displaced populations. Many of these threats intersect and compound one another.

IDP numbers also remain high because **millions of people are trapped in protracted displacement**.¹² Many IDPs are unable to re-establish a safe and lasting home because the conflicts that displaced them still persist with no end in sight.¹³ In some cases, **second and even third generations of children have been born into displacement** and grow up without ever having known their family's original home. While disaster displacement is often viewed as a short-term phenomenon, the reality is that it too can become protracted. According to one analysis, an estimated 7 million people who fled disasters remained trapped in internal displacement at the end of 2020.¹⁴

The second defining feature of this crisis is the high levels of human rights violations and human suffering. As noted by Cecilia Jimenez-Damary, Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs: "The experience of internal displacement often encompasses massive human rights violations and abuses prior to, during and in the aftermath of displacement, the consequences of which continue while persons remain displaced and even after they have achieved physical return, local integration or settlement elsewhere."¹⁵ IDPs are forced from their homes, uprooted from their livelihoods and separated from their support networks and family members. Even in the comparative 'safety' of displacement, many live in dangerous conditions and continue to face significant risks and violations of their rights. Women and girls are exposed to heightened levels of **sexual and gender-based violence**, including assault, abuse, early and forced marriage and sexual exploitation.¹⁶ Children lose access to formal **education** and may be more vulnerable to recruitment by gangs or armed groups, radicalization, trafficking and negative coping strategies.¹⁹ IDPs often lack **livelihoods** and are among the most

BOX 1

Who are 'internally displaced persons' and what is 'internal displacement'?

According to the 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement:

*"Internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border."*¹⁷

This descriptive definition does not confer a legal status, as the rights and guarantees to which IDPs are entitled come from the fact that they are **citizens or residents of their country** – although some IDPs are in fact stateless and may have difficulty accessing basic rights. However, having a term to describe this population is important as IDPs generally have **specific vulnerabilities and needs** stemming from the fact that they are displaced.¹⁸

The causes listed in the definition are meant to provide examples rather than an exhaustive list. **'Natural or human-made disasters'** includes slow- and sudden-onset disasters and the adverse impacts of climate change, as well as technological disasters and development projects that fail to take account of human rights obligations.

'Internal displacement' relates to the phenomenon of internal displacement in all its dimensions and addresses a wider set of affected persons than just IDPs, including, in particular, host communities.

food-insecure parts of the population. Most live outside of camps and in **urban areas** where they are among the poorest of the poor, **lack secure housing**²⁰ and are exposed to a wide range of health, social and economic risks.²¹

Further compounding these challenges is the fact that IDPs are often unable to access State assistance and basic services like public health systems²² and social benefits like pensions or unemployment assistance. They may lack **civil documentation** that is crucial for integrating into these systems, applying for jobs, voting in elections or reclaiming their housing, land or other property.²³ **Older people and people with disabilities**, in particular, often struggle to access effective assistance and support.²⁴ **Population groups that were already marginalized** prior to displacement – for example, those belonging to ethnic or religious minorities or diverse sexual or gender orientation groups – often face further **stigma and exclusion**.²⁵ Yet, despite their significant needs, IDPs can be driven further into hiding out of **fear of those in power**.²⁶ Across all groups, the experience of being forced to flee their homes and the dynamics of living in displacement can cause severe **psychological distress**.

In many contexts, displacement is unplanned, arbitrary and represents a **breakdown of the social contract** between States and their citizens and residents – a breach of the promise and obligation of the State to keep its people safe from harm. As subsequent chapters will illustrate, recovery from displacement is thus also about recovering the **trust and confidence** of populations in the State.

The third defining feature of the global displacement crisis is its impacts on development, stability and societies at large. Internal displacement not only devastates those who are displaced but can also put a strain on the communities hosting them. Large-scale protracted displacement can stall and even reverse progress towards achieving

“Covid-19 has claimed many lives in my community and overwhelmed our health centre. It has also negatively affected my country’s economy.”

IDP in Somalia; consultations for the Panel

the **Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)** by increasing poverty, exacerbating inequality and exposing IDPs and host communities to heightened risks to their health and safety.²⁷ Within local economies, influxes of displaced populations can affect markets and influence average wages and housing prices in displacement-affected areas.²⁸ If the impoverishment and marginalization of IDPs are not addressed and host communities do not receive sufficient support, displacement can also contribute to **fragility**, create **tensions** and plant the seeds for **future displacement risks**.

How did we end up here? The answer points to an uncomfortable but undeniable truth: there has been a **collective failure to prevent, address and resolve internal displacement**.

This is not the result of a lack of dedicated effort. On the contrary, over the past three decades, States, the UN, regional organizations and civil society have taken **considerable steps to address internal displacement** and shine a spotlight on this global crisis. A global normative framework was developed, regional and national legal frameworks have been adopted and the UN Secretary-General has tasked high-level officials with leading aspects of internal displacement responses.²⁹ And yet, despite these measures, the internal displacement crisis continues to worsen.

Our conclusion is that the root of the problem runs much deeper. We are struck most of all by the **lack of political will** to address internal displacement. **Too many States fail to acknowledge or take responsibility for their displaced citizens and residents.** The UN, donor countries and international financial institutions, among others, have also not demonstrated the level of commitment required to overcome this global crisis, particularly in contexts of protracted displacement.

We believe there are several intersecting problems that contribute to this shortfall of political will. First, in many cases, there is **limited appreciation of the far-reaching costs of inaction** on internal displacement.³⁰ Second, even where the importance of action is understood and political will is present, **capacity gaps and operational constraints** often impede progress. Third, internal displacement is frequently not prioritized, owned or addressed due to **competing agendas**. And fourth, despite clear responsibilities – including, most fundamentally, of States to their displaced citizens and residents – there is **limited accountability** for actors that fail to respond appropriately to internal displacement or cause displacement in the first place.

We have also seen that across all actors, **internal displacement is still primarily viewed as a short-term humanitarian issue.** While humanitarian organizations play a critical role in saving lives and alleviating suffering, the approach to internal displacement as a de facto responsibility of international humanitarian actors has detracted from the **obligation of States** to step up as the primary duty bearers and lead action for solutions. It has also meant that other key actors across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus and in disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation³¹ have not delivered on their own roles in the prevention and sustainable resolution of internal displacement.

As a result of these factors, **internal displacement is all too often neglected** in Government policies and plans, UN strategies and guidance,

development financing and in public communications and media. **This invisibility creates a vicious circle:** the less visible IDPs are, the less they are prioritized. And the less they are prioritized, the further they slip into obscurity and neglect. While the world committed to ‘leaving no one behind’ as part of the SDGs, including with a specific acknowledgement of the need to empower IDPs through the implementation of the 2030 Agenda,³² internal displacement has yet to be afforded the global attention and action it so urgently requires.

The internal displacement crisis is also compounded and exacerbated by other **concurrent global crises** and dynamics in the broader international environment. One such factor that emerged during our work was the rapid spread of the **COVID-19 pandemic**, which had swift and deadly consequences all around the world. Millions of people have lost their lives to the virus and an estimated 97 million have been pushed into extreme poverty by the ripple effects of the pandemic.³³ For displaced families living in cramped settlements with limited access to health care, safety nets and savings, the combined effects of the crisis have been particularly acute.³⁴ The global economic downturn it triggered also means that Governments have to contend with sustaining their economies while managing a public health crisis, leaving even less space for displacement-related needs. This is true for both displacement-affected countries and traditional donor States.³⁵ In fragile countries, the increasing competition over ever more constrained resources deepens the risk of new or renewed displacement.

The **global climate crisis** will also have implications for internal displacement, with the number of people displaced by disasters expected to climb dramatically in the coming decades as the aggravating effects of climate change are increasingly felt.³⁶ An analysis by the World Bank found that unless action is urgently taken, there could be more than 143 million internal climate

migrants³⁷ by 2050 in just three regions of the world alone.³⁸ While not all of these movements will be forced displacements, the figure is nevertheless alarming. Climate change will also extend the risk of displacement to new places, including to countries that have not previously been faced with large disaster displacement challenges.³⁹ Climate change impacts will not be felt by all countries equally, however. Those with fewer resources or more direct exposure to hazards are likely to face more severe effects. In the Sahel, communities have suffered from severe episodes of drought and desertification over the past 50 years.⁴⁰ In some small island developing States, rising sea levels pose not only a displacement risk but an existential threat in which entire nations may be submerged or rendered uninhabitable.⁴¹ As Secretary-General António Guterres highlighted: “Limiting global temperature rise is a matter of survival for climate vulnerable countries. And we are running out of time.”⁴²

Finally, the **declining commitment to multilateralism** among key powers around the globe is hindering the prevention and resolution of displacement crises. A rise in nationalist politics, a frequently gridlocked UN Security Council and the erosion in commitments to human rights and democratic norms all threaten the ability of the international system to pull together to address internal displacement. While a certain amount of solidarity has been achieved around addressing migrant and refugee movements, the perception of internal displacement as a domestic issue has hampered the progression of a responsibility-sharing approach, even in contexts where solidarity is clearly warranted.



CHAPTER TWO

The Imperative for Durable Solutions

Displaced mother with her children in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. April 2021.
Credit: UNHCR/Martim Gray Pereira

2. The Imperative for Durable Solutions

Around the world, **millions of IDPs are trapped in situations of protracted displacement**. They have spent years, and sometimes decades, in limbo, unable to find an end to their displacement or achieve a durable solution. We examined a number of these situations closely and heard from individuals who fled conflict in Syria, gang violence in Central America, and flooding and cyclones in Bangladesh and the Philippines. Across all of the 22 countries where IDPs shared their views and experiences with us,⁴³ there was a common message: **one day in displacement is a day too many**. IDPs need help to find a lasting home.

In 2016, the UN Secretary-General called for new and protracted internal displacement to be reduced by at least 50 per cent by 2030.⁴⁴ With the numbers of IDPs continuing to climb, this call is more urgent than ever before. There is a critical imperative to scale up efforts to help IDPs to achieve durable solutions. **‘Durable solutions’** in this context refers to the ability of IDPs to reintegrate into society and reach a point where they no longer have needs associated with being displaced. It is a **gradual, long-term process** whereby an IDP progressively escapes the harmful effects of displacement until a sustainable resolution is found. Solutions can be achieved through IDPs returning to their places of origin, integrating locally or settling in another part of the country.⁴⁵ Crucially, as one analysis explains: “A durable solution for IDPs is one that lasts. If people return home but are not safe, IDPs have not found a solution. If an IDP camp is closed, but IDPs have nowhere to go, they have not found a durable solution.”⁴⁶

We made the decision to focus primarily on contexts where the security situation or

disaster impacts have improved sufficiently to allow for solutions and **where the authorities show a degree of willingness** to take action to address displacement. While recognizing that many millions of IDPs continue to be trapped in contexts where they are rejected, oppressed or persecuted by their Governments or are in areas controlled by non-State armed groups (situations that, as subsequent sections and chapters describe, must be confronted with far greater international political leadership and accountability), we believe the chance must be seized to drive meaningful progress for IDPs in locations where solutions are within reach.

By redoubling efforts to support solutions in such contexts, including by recognizing it as core to the global commitment to ‘leave no one behind’, we are convinced that a breakthrough can be achieved for millions of people trapped in protracted displacement. Doing so begins with acknowledging that as citizens and residents of their country, **IDPs have a right to decide where to settle**. In our consultations with IDPs, we found that while around half of them hoped to return to their former homes to reconnect with their ancestral land, communities and former livelihoods, the other half preferred integration into the local community or settlement in another part of the country.

Consistent with global urbanization trends, **more and more IDPs are likely to settle in urban areas**. Although precise data is limited, we know the vast majority of IDPs already live in non-camp settings in towns and cities, with host communities in rural areas, and in informal settlements. The reality of growing urban internal displacement requires all actors to change their approaches to response.⁴⁷

The focus across all types of contexts must be on creating the conditions for **voluntary, safe and dignified solutions** in line with established norms.⁴⁸

All solutions must be recognized as equally legitimate. While return can be a critical solution for many IDPs, States and other actors must put an end to treating return as the inherently best or only option.⁴⁹

The path to solutions is unique for each individual, and **people of different ages, genders and diversities** will have distinct experiences and needs that shape this process. These factors must be taken into account as part of a human rights-based approach to addressing internal displacement.⁵⁰ **Protection** and the safety, security, and rights of IDPs should likewise guide how actors engage with authorities and design intervention strategies.⁵¹

Internal displacement also intersects and overlaps with other forms of internal and cross-border population movements.⁵² Solutions for IDPs must therefore be viewed alongside **solutions for other groups**, in particular refugees, people displaced outside of their country by disasters and the impact of climate change, and returnees. The Panel encourages a **holistic, whole-of-displacement approach** that takes into account the needs of all of these groups as well as the communities in areas of both displacement and origin.

Drawing on our consultations with IDPs and research on protracted displacement, we have seen that action is typically needed across five core areas to enable solutions. First, it is imperative to address persistent **safety and security risks** that prevent IDPs from establishing a permanent home, whether in areas of origin or elsewhere.⁵³ In some cases, the original drivers of displacement have yet to be resolved – active conflict persists, areas are still controlled by armed groups, or the enduring impacts of disasters prevent return or settlement elsewhere. New

“The factories and the other economic projects that were providing jobs have all been destroyed. If people return, they will be jobless as there is no functioning sector of economy. Even the date palm farms were burnt.”

IDP, Libya; consultations for the Panel

risks may also have emerged during the crisis that hinder the ability of individuals to re-engage with society – for instance, where displaced civilians are perceived to be associated with an opposition group or a warring faction and are rejected by those in power. Additionally, individuals may fear future displacement risks, whether because tensions still linger in conflict-affected communities or because disaster risks have not been mitigated. Each of these risks needs to be understood and addressed for people to feel safe enough to re-establish their lives.

Second, for IDPs to regain their self-sufficiency, they need **jobs, livelihoods and access to income and social protection systems** like pensions and unemployment funds. This came across strongly in our consultations with IDPs. In some cases, agricultural land and assets essential to livelihoods have been destroyed, contaminated or are still inaccessible.⁵⁴ In other contexts, IDPs have limited ability or resources to carry out their former or familial livelihoods and lack access to new employment opportunities. This is particularly common in cases of second or third generation IDPs or of IDPs moving from rural to urban environments or vice versa. The jobs they do find can be precarious and are usually concentrated in low-skilled, informal or under-regulated sectors.⁵⁵

Supporting the recovery of livelihoods requires targeted action based on the nature of the challenge faced. In some cases, restoring access to former land may be all that is required, or IDPs may need only marginal assistance in the form of essential assets like seeds or tools. In other contexts, particularly when IDPs integrate locally or settle elsewhere, they may need help to access new livelihoods and skills training. One example of a program to support IDP livelihoods is highlighted in **Box 2**.

A third essential element is **housing, land and property**. Many IDPs described the challenges they faced in reclaiming their homes that were damaged, destroyed or rendered permanently uninhabitable.⁵⁶ The presence of explosive remnants of war can make it impossible for IDPs to reoccupy their former houses or land, while, in other cases, land and homes have been occupied,

illegally grabbed or redistributed. A lack of civil documentation proving ownership or tenure is also a significant obstacle to resuming occupancy or claiming compensation, particularly in contexts where such matters are managed through customary or informal arrangements.⁵⁷ IDPs trying to integrate locally or settle elsewhere may also face prohibitive housing prices, heightened risks of eviction (particularly in cases of informal occupancy) and increased vulnerability to exploitation by predatory landlords. Addressing these challenges requires a tailored approach that may include financial assistance or compensation, legal and administrative support to recover tenure, or assistance in finding new housing or land.

Fourth, **education** was highlighted by IDPs – particularly children and youth – as a core building block for long-term solutions. Access

BOX 2

Livelihoods for solutions

The Panel repeatedly heard that livelihoods are one of the most critical requirements for achieving a lasting solution to displacement. Many individuals flee from rural areas to cities and need support to access other forms of income during displacement. Depending on IDPs' preferred solution – return, local integration or settlement elsewhere – they may also need support to restart their former livelihood or take up a new job long-term. Restoring livelihoods for IDPs requires concerted efforts by national and local authorities, as well as development, peace and humanitarian actors.

We have seen successful initiatives in a number of contexts. In northern Afghanistan, for example, the International Labour Organization (ILO) launched a Road to Jobs (R2J) project to address constraints

in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors so that the Government and businesses could innovate and create more and better jobs for IDPs and poorer members of the local communities, in particular young people and women-headed households. Following an in-depth market analysis, IDPs received training on skills sought by companies in the selected sectors. At the same time, these companies agreed to develop inclusive business models that would increase productivity while simultaneously creating decent work opportunities for marginalized groups. The project successfully demonstrated the advantages of training and recruiting local IDPs to help reduce production costs and improve productivity. Thanks to the project, the recruitment of IDPs in the area has increased significantly, with one company alone hiring over 100 IDPs.⁵⁸

to the national education system is the most sustainable way to provide displaced children with quality learning opportunities in the long term. In many places, however, integrating displaced children into local schools is hampered by challenges affecting the education systems (e.g., destruction or occupation of school buildings, lack of personnel or overcrowding) or particular obstacles facing displaced children (e.g., lost years of schooling, language barriers or the costs of education).⁵⁹ To overcome these impediments, investments are needed in public education infrastructure, support for teachers and targeted assistance for displaced children and youth. In situations where children or youth have missed years of schooling, accelerated learning and fast-track programmes can be invaluable. Community-based learning can also be a useful interim measure in cases where the local education system was severely disrupted or absent.⁶⁰

Fifth, access to other forms of **basic infrastructure and services** is vital for IDPs to be able to reintegrate into society. Public hospitals, water and sewage systems, and electricity are essential for everyday life, but these systems are often destroyed, depleted, or the personnel who administer them have fled. Even where those systems are still functioning, they may not have the resources or capacity to provide for the large numbers of IDPs. Without addressing these issues, both IDPs and host communities will struggle to meet their basic needs and recover from the crisis.

We believe there is a need for a **fundamental change in the way we go about solutions**. In contexts that have achieved relative stability, there is a need to go beyond the humanitarian model designed for the provision of lifesaving assistance, towards a **development-oriented approach** that focuses on **strengthening public systems and services** as a whole to be able to absorb IDPs and ensure that they, along with other members of the local community, are

“We love education and want to return to school, obtain certificates and go to university, but we face many obstacles, especially us girls.”

Female IDP youth, Syria, consultations for the Panel

protected and supported by the State. This calls for far stronger emphasis on **nationally owned action** and a recognition of the rights and agency of IDPs as citizens and residents of their country. It also requires earlier and more predictable engagement of **development, peace and disaster management actors** to address the governance, infrastructure, social cohesion, security and risk reduction components that are essential for achieving solutions at scale. Alongside this, **tailor-made solutions** must continue to be supported for vulnerable individuals and marginalized groups, including to ensure that people of all ages, genders and diversities are able to find a safe and lasting end to their displacement. Finally, it also calls for **international solidarity** with the IDPs and host communities and a firm commitment by international actors to support affected countries to find solutions.

Achieving these shifts requires action to foster a **shared, development-oriented vision** of durable solutions which, among other elements, recognizes addressing displacement as crucial to the attainment of the SDGs. As elaborated in subsequent sections, internal displacement needs to be proactively addressed as part of development efforts to ensure that the commitment to ‘leave no one behind’ includes IDPs and the communities that host them.

We are convinced that this vision can be achieved if the following elements are in place:

- Strong political will and Government capacity to lead durable solutions efforts in ways that bring together all relevant ministries and all levels of government.
- A key role for IDPs, local communities, civil society, the media and academia.
- Greater use of the private sector's capacities.
- A UN system with strengthened leadership and accountability on solutions.
- Predictable financing to catalyse action on solutions and support national ownership in the long term.
- Systems to generate and analyse necessary data and knowledge.

The sections that follow elaborate what needs to be done to make these requirements a reality.

2.1 Strengthen Government political will, capacity and action

States bear the primary responsibility for supporting their displaced citizens and residents to achieve an end to their displacement. This is not just a legal obligation but also an operational necessity: we have seen that **Government leadership is crucial for resolving displacement sustainably and at scale**. As Box 3 illustrates, we have seen that with concerted efforts – including a commitment to resolve the root causes of crises – solutions can and have been achieved.

We looked at the issue of Government leadership on solutions from two angles. First, **Section 2.1.1** outlines actions Governments should take to support their displaced populations to achieve a solution. Second, **Section 2.1.2** details steps to catalyse Government political will and action in contexts where it is lacking.

2.1.1 Make solutions a nationally owned, whole-of-government priority

An important starting point for effective Government action is recognizing that as citizens and residents of a country, **IDPs should be the responsibility of all parts of government**, from the highest levels of political leadership to local and city authorities and across all relevant ministries.⁶¹ Recognizing displacement as a national priority is essential for delivering responses that promote the full restoration of IDPs' rights and rebuild trust and confidence with IDPs and host communities. It is also a critical building block for ensuring that all parts of society can benefit from and contribute to national development.

At present, many countries task internal displacement uniquely to their humanitarian ministries or disaster management offices. While this approach may be appropriate immediately following a crisis

when rapid and streamlined delivery of humanitarian assistance is critical, maintaining this structure long-term makes it more difficult to engage the full capacities of the State in resolving internal displacement. Rather, we believe it is vital that States adopt a **'whole-of-government' approach** in which all parts of government actively contribute to solutions and local, city and municipal authorities are strongly supported.⁶²

This whole-of-government approach is essential for **embedding a development approach to internal displacement** within Governments. To further cement this shift, it is important to incorporate solutions to internal displacement into **national and local development plans** and the **sector-specific plans** of individual ministries.⁶³ The plans should preferably outline qualitative and quantitative targets that align with the SDGs.

BOX 3

Solutions successes

Over the past three decades, a number of countries have succeeded in finding solutions for their displaced populations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, over 1 million IDPs returned home following the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and the establishment of a national Law on Refugees and Displaced Persons. In Sierra Leone, nearly 500,000 IDPs returned following the 1999 Lome Peace Accord and the implementation of a national IDP resettlement programme. In Uganda, all but a small proportion of the 1.8 million people displaced in the north during the Lord's Resistance Army insurgency returned or found lasting homes following the 2006 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement.

Building on this, States should also report on how their national development efforts address the rights and needs of IDPs as part of their Voluntary National Reviews.⁶⁴

The value of proactively addressing displacement as part of national and local development efforts cannot be overstated. Doing so situates solutions within broader **shared priorities** and facilitates joined-up action across all parts of government working towards a common goal. It can also assist in **rebuilding the social contract** in contexts where IDPs had been displaced or neglected by authorities and help restore trust and confidence of the population in the State. Embedding responses to displacement within development plans also helps to engage international development actors and attract financial resources. Ultimately, these efforts are critical for **reducing fragility** and achieving the **SDGs**.

Recognizing that internal displacement is an increasingly urban phenomenon and that many

IDPs will permanently settle in urban areas, it is also **essential that internal displacement be addressed as part of urban planning**. Cities should not be seen as only the backdrop where displacement occurs but as a rich ecosystem that can contribute to the resolution of displacement.⁶⁵ The presence of markets, infrastructure, services and job opportunities can help IDPs to recover their independence. To fully capitalize on this potential and support both IDPs and cities to flourish, displacement should be considered in both spatial planning of cities and as an important element of sector-based systems and services. City authorities need to be supported by national authorities in these efforts with both policies and frameworks to guide their work and the financial resources to enable them to take action. The experiences in San Pedro Sula, Honduras outlined in **Box 4** show how one country and municipality have approached this. As detailed in later sections of this report, effective urban responses also require international actors to work far more closely with and through local city systems.⁶⁶

BOX 4

Integrating internal displacement in local plans and programmes in San Pedro Sula, Honduras

Honduras is part of the Northern Triangle of Central America where gang violence and organized crime are leading causes of displacement. San Pedro Sula, Honduras' second largest city, is among the municipalities most affected by internal displacement. In recent years, the city has taken a range of measures to ensure an **integrated approach to internal displacement at the municipal level**. Its 2017 Master Plan includes input from IDPs and local communities. The municipality also developed a displacement-specific response plan in 2018 under the national strategy on internal displacement.

As part of the plan, the city authorities set up a **technical committee to respond to displacement**, including through interventions focused on

social service delivery, prevention, security and urban mobility, job training and financial support. **Municipal policies**, such as the policy for children and adolescents, now include IDP-specific measures. The municipality **registers land and housing** that IDPs were forced to leave behind and IDP-specific information is also collected in the city's statistical **information system**. In a discussion with the Panel, the municipality highlighted how international **technical support** had been critical in developing its internal displacement plan and helping to implement portions of programming supporting IDPs. The municipality also highlighted how much it had benefited from peer-to-peer learning – particularly a staff visit to Colombia, facilitated by UNHCR and NGOs, to learn how municipalities had tackled displacement there.⁶⁷

In many contexts, general development and urban plans addressing internal displacement may need to be complemented by a more focused national or local **solutions strategy** and **costed plan** that provide greater detail on how different ministries and actors will come together to facilitate solutions. Such a strategy can be particularly valuable in helping humanitarian actors (who are generally not involved with development plans) to understand their role in contributing to solutions. To this end, it is crucial that Governments, the UN, NGOs, international financiers, the private sector and civil society work together to articulate such a strategy. The strategy should be designed in consultation and partnership with IDPs and community representatives of all ages, genders and diversities to ensure a nuanced understanding of the context and shared agreement on priorities.

Coordination structures are crucial for ensuring a joined-up approach. These mechanisms should bring together all relevant parts of government, across ministries and at all levels, to create a predictable platform for exchanging information and working collectively to advance solutions. Given that local and city authorities are often on the frontlines of displacement, it will be critical that they have a voice in these forums. The coordination body will also be useful in identifying and harmonizing instances where the priorities of certain parts of government may be at odds with resolving displacement or preventing its occurrence or recurrence. An example of how one country, Somalia, has developed its approach to coordination is shown in **Box 5** on the next page.

Creating **links between relevant Government bodies and the UN and other international actors** is also essential. UN agencies, NGOs, international donors and financiers, and private sector actors can all be valuable allies and supporters of the Government as it works towards solutions. At present, however, we see that communication and coordination between these actors is not always sufficiently predictable or systematic. To address this, we encourage Governments and

UN Resident Coordinators to work together to establish a strong mechanism to facilitate this type of engagement at national and local levels. Crucially, this coordination should also include IDP and host community representatives and local civil society.

To underpin all these different elements, States should ensure **laws and policies** are in place that outline the specific rights and protections afforded to IDPs. Governments that have developed such policies have highlighted that they have far-reaching impacts, including in providing a foundation for planning, budgeting and action across different ministries and parts of government. City authorities have also described to us how much they valued having laws and policies in place to provide clarity on expectations and responsibilities. Laws and policies can also serve as an invaluable basis for national accountability mechanisms. Recognizing that traditional gender roles are often affected by internal displacement, these laws also present an opportunity to redress legal or societal inequalities that prevent women from exercising their full rights – for example, to hold or inherit property or pass on citizenship to their children.⁶⁸ We commend the 43 nations that have already adopted IDP laws and policies⁶⁹ and encourage Governments that have yet to develop them to consider undertaking a review of existing applicable legal frameworks to identify any gaps that may need to be filled. States should also assess where existing laws may need to be amended to avoid discriminatory effects on IDPs. Equally important, however, is ensuring implementation of existing laws and policies, which we saw was a key gap in many of the countries with frameworks currently in place.⁷⁰

Internal displacement also needs to be integrated into other types of policies and processes that are not primarily focused on displacement, but which are highly relevant for resolving it. **Peace processes**, for example, have not consistently addressed internal displacement and IDPs themselves (and particularly women,⁷¹ youth

and minority groups) have rarely had a voice in them.⁷² This is a critical missed opportunity to promote sustainable peace and we encourage displacement and IDPs to be included far more systematically in these types of efforts.⁷³

In addition to peace processes, **restitution** of property left behind and **compensation** for destroyed or lost property are crucial for enabling IDPs to rebuild their lives and for the closure they can help provide for communities that have suffered during crises.

Transitional justice, namely initiatives to promote recovery from widespread rights violations through recognition of harm⁷⁴ and efforts to promote **social cohesion** through effective dialogue and reconciliation between communities are also essential for sustainably resolving conflicts and to prevent the emergence or resurgence of new conflicts in the future. We have seen, however, that these types of

initiatives are insufficiently utilized. Many countries lack the resources to offer effective compensation while, in others, informal approaches to housing and property tenure create challenges for IDPs in reclaiming their rights and entitlements. Even where the means are available, many States do not prioritize such initiatives. We strongly urge that authorities actively promote these types of efforts that contribute to healing, recovery, reconciliation and social cohesion.

It is also **essential that States provide appropriate resourcing** to resolve internal displacement.⁷⁵ Budgetary allocations should be made on the basis of updated data on the current and potential users of public systems and services, ensuring that this includes IDPs. As part of this assessment, it is important to consider how the needs of IDPs differ to those of other segments of

BOX 5

Setting up a coordination system on durable solutions in Somalia

The Federal Government of Somalia has steadily increased its focus on durable solutions to internal displacement since 2012, following a severe famine that displaced millions of people. In 2016, it launched the **Durable Solutions Initiative** together with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC) and with the support of the Deputy Prime Minister. What started as a joint initiative between the Government and the UN evolved into a **nationally owned coordination system**. In November 2018, the Federal Government established a **Durable Solutions Unit** within the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development. The following year, in order to ensure a whole-of-government approach, a **National Durable Solutions Secretariat** was established to facilitate coordination across 14 Government entities, including the Office of the Prime Minister. The Secretariat provides technical expertise and high-level strategic guidance and oversight to ensure that durable solutions

initiatives are prioritized and implemented and are in line with the National Development Plan, National Social Development Road Map and other relevant Government frameworks and policies.

To generate evidence on what was needed and build consensus, the Government, together with humanitarian, development and peace actors, developed and implemented **data collection, analysis and monitoring**. Building on these efforts, a **National Durable Solutions Strategy** was developed and a **national law on IDPs** will be adopted in line with the African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa ("The Kampala Convention"). Somalia has also developed durable solutions coordination mechanisms within **regional administrations**, such as in Banadir where the capital, Mogadishu, is located, and has set up a durable solutions coordination group between the Government Durable Solutions Unit and the Resident Coordinator's Office.⁷⁶

the population. IDPs may have a higher need for mental health support or job assistance programs than non-displaced persons, for example, which may require additional resourcing for those public services in areas heavily affected by displacement. In addition, mayors and other municipal and local actors that we spoke to emphasized that having access to dedicated funds for responses to internal displacement, rather than having to draw from general development budgets or municipal funds, makes it far easier for them to support IDP integration into local systems and services.

A final area we believe is crucial for States to prioritize is **high-quality data**. As **Section 2.6** will elaborate further, there is a need for national systems to collect, manage and analyse internal displacement data. This information is important in moving Governments towards recognizing and acknowledging displacement and to galvanize State prioritization and action. It also allows the Government to make evidence-based decisions to feed into policies and strategies, operational plans and budgeting, including to anticipate and mitigate risks of future displacement.

Recommendation 1:

Make solutions a nationally owned, whole-of-government priority

More specifically:

- States are urged to acknowledge IDPs and situations of internal displacement and ensure that action to address displacement is a national priority, recognizing it as both a duty of the State to its citizens and residents and a critical step for development, peace and prosperity.
- States should adopt a development-oriented approach to internal displacement, including by systematically integrating internal displacement into national and local development plans and the plans of relevant ministries, and by reporting on how their national development efforts address the rights and needs of IDPs in their Voluntary National Reviews.
- States must recognize that internal displacement is likely to be increasingly an urban phenomenon and should support local authorities to address it deliberately as part of urban planning, including in spatial planning, and make full use of the cities' resources, infrastructure and capacities to contribute to solutions.
- States should address displacement in peace processes, include IDPs of all ages, genders and diversities in associated dialogues and should promote compensation, restitution, transitional justice and social cohesion initiatives as part of the recovery process.
- States are encouraged to work with IDPs, host communities, local authorities, civil society, the private sector, the UN, NGOs and international financiers to develop dedicated solutions strategies and costed operational plans.
- States should institutionalize a whole-of-government approach to addressing internal displacement, support local and municipal authorities and establish clear mechanisms for coordinating action across all relevant parts of government.
- States should work with the UN Resident Coordinator to put in place a mechanism for coordinating with relevant international and local actors, including representatives of displaced and host communities.
- States should adopt and implement laws and policies on internal displacement in line with human rights.
- States are urged to allocate funds for solutions from domestic budgets, including to support local and city authorities, and ensure that funding allocations are based on current regional and municipality population figures (including IDPs) and the distinct service needs of IDPs.

2.1.2 Political will is key and should be catalysed

As part of their sovereign duty, States bear the primary responsibility to protect and respond to the needs of their citizens. However, we observed that States have **varying levels of political will and capacity** to address internal displacement. In some cases, Governments are committed to taking action but lack the technical or financial capacity to do so. In others, capacities are present but displacement is not seen as a priority. In extreme cases, States are both unable and unwilling to respond or are even responsible for causing displacement in the first place. Across all contexts, there is **limited accountability** for inaction or failures.

We believe there is a need **to catalyse political will**, capacity and action in cases where they are weak or absent.

From our research and consultations, we have concluded that a **combination of positive incentives and accountability measures** are needed to enhance political will and change the mindsets of leaders on internal displacement. Political will is often stronger when States feel there is **benefit in stepping up action** to address displacement. State interests in maintaining or cultivating a positive international reputation, generating domestic public support, accessing financing and enabling investments can be powerful motivations. These can be harnessed and built upon to bring about change. At the same time, States need to feel that there will be **consequences for failing to address displacement or violating the rights of IDPs**. As explained further below, this requires strengthening accountability at all levels.

It is crucial that **action to drive change** takes root and flourishes, first and foremost, at the **local and national levels**. IDP and host community advocates, national human rights institutions,⁷⁷ civil society actors and local media actors have shown grit and determination in bringing attention to human rights and displacement issues and have contributed

to cultivating public pressure for action.⁷⁸ Their engagement can serve as a positive catalyst for government action, offering the potential for popular support for leaders who work to resolve displacement, and also help to hold governments to account. We encourage local and national actors to continue these efforts and use their voices to raise awareness of and mobilize action on internal displacement. They should call particular attention to the risks, realities, problems and opportunities that exist in their context. Political leaders, both in and outside of Government, should also take up internal displacement as a priority issue and should call on their fellow politicians to address the rights and needs of their displaced citizens and residents. Domestic judicial systems have also been instrumental in compelling action on displacement in a number of contexts and we hope they will continue to be actively engaged in driving change.⁷⁹

International actors can also play a critical role in helping to catalyse political will and action. One crucial avenue for this is strengthening **diplomatic engagement and advocacy with States at the highest political level**. Representatives of States, regional organizations and the UN described the positive shifts in State behaviour and political commitment they observed following high-level visits dedicated to the issue of internal displacement. There are various actors within the UN system who already provide some of this engagement, notably the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, UN Resident Coordinators and heads of UN agencies at global and national levels. There are also actors outside the UN system who engage in diplomacy and advocacy, including representatives of other States, regional organizations, NGOs and financing institutions, among others. Nevertheless, we have observed that there remain gaps, particularly in relation to high-level engagement with States in protracted displacement contexts and on issues linked to solutions.

Strengthening this high-level engagement is essential. We believe this should be achieved both by

reinforcing the work of existing actors and, as elaborated in greater detail in **Section 2.4**, by appointing a **Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Solutions to Internal Displacement** that could spearhead advocacy and diplomacy on solutions. We are convinced that it is only with a new, dedicated, high-level position that the necessary predictability and consistency of engagement can be achieved.

In addition to the appointment of an SRSG, we also encourage the UN Secretary-General to produce an **annual report on the State of Solutions to Internal Displacement**. Such a report would provide visibility for States that have taken positive steps to resolve displacement while enhancing accountability by documenting areas where improvements are still needed. We believe this could be a valuable tool for enhancing political will and action. Such a report would also assist in tracking and measuring global progress in addressing internal displacement, which we believe needs to be undertaken more systematically.

Regional organizations have a crucial role to play and we encourage them to engage earlier and more predictably with States to **de-escalate conflicts and resolve displacement crises**. They should also continue to drive progress at the legal and normative levels. The African Union has been at the forefront of some of the greatest normative achievements in advancing IDP rights, most notably the adoption of the African Union Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, which provided the first – and as yet, the only – continent-wide binding legal framework on internal displacement.⁸⁰ Other regional organizations (including the League of Arab States, the Organization of American States and the Council of Europe) have passed IDP resolutions.⁸¹ These have been important first steps, and **we encourage regions to continue strengthening legal and policy frameworks** on internal displacement. Equally, however, we believe it is

essential that regional organizations promote stronger implementation of the resolutions and frameworks that are already in place.

State action on internal displacement is not only an issue of political will but also of capacity. Many national and local authorities told us that while they are ready and willing to take action, they lack much-needed technical assistance. To address this, we believe it is critical to ensure that States have **access to predictable capacity support** that enables them to draw on the full range of available expertise from other States, regional organizations, the UN system, civil society, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, financial institutions and academia. A combination of steps are needed to enable this, including providing expert secondments to government offices and strengthening networks of academic experts. Should an SRSG be appointed as we have recommended, we also encourage the office to be used as an entry point for technical assistance requests on internal displacement.

Building on feedback from States and regional organizations, we have also concluded that there is a need to create more systematic **State-to-State engagement** within and across regions where Governments can share experiences, present their achievements and learn from each other.⁸² These types of engagements have the dual benefit of both supporting State capacity and providing acknowledgement for States that are taking positive steps. We encourage regional organizations to take the lead in convening such engagements and to build on existing mechanisms where feasible. Regional organizations could also draw on the support of the UN and civil society, and could capitalize on initiatives like GP2.0 – a multi-stakeholder initiative that has facilitated State-to-State engagement on internal displacement in the past.⁸³ While retaining the focus on engagement between States, we also suggest involving experts and representatives from civil society, academia, UN organizations, the private sector and financial institutions.

Financing is also a key factor in influencing levels of political will and enabling action. As **Section 2.5** will elaborate further, improved access to financing not only provides greater operational capacity but, in doing so, can help raise the level of priority given to addressing internal displacement. Access to funding is important not only for national Governments but, crucially, also for city authorities and other local actors.

Finally, catalysing action requires **ending cultures of impunity and holding States accountable for their actions**. We believe that accountability should be approached through different and complementary channels, beginning from the

ground up. Domestic courts and mechanisms such as the International Criminal Court can and should be used to prosecute the most egregious cases of abuse by States and non-State armed actors, including for forced displacement itself and for other crimes that contribute to displacement. In addition, we believe that measures are needed to strengthen accountability across a wider range of contexts. UN processes and reporting can be an important tool for this, including through UN treaty bodies, the Universal Periodic Review, the Human Rights Council's Special Procedures (particularly the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs) and fact-finding missions.⁸⁴

Recommendation 2: Political will is key and should be catalysed

More specifically:

- Local and national actors, both within governments and in civil society, should drive change and bring attention to displacement, cultivate public pressure for action and hold leaders accountable for addressing internal displacement.
- Regional organizations should adopt relevant legal and policy frameworks on internal displacement and work towards their implementation.
- Regional organizations, with the support of other relevant actors, should facilitate predictable opportunities for State-to-State engagement on internal displacement, where States can present their achievements, exchange their experiences and learn from each other.
- Representatives of the UN, States, regional organizations, NGOs and financing institutions should strengthen their diplomacy with States on internal displacement, particularly to advocate for solutions.
- The UN Secretary-General should strengthen the UN's diplomacy and advocacy by appointing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Solutions to Internal Displacement to provide continuous engagement with States on solutions.
- The UN Secretary General is encouraged to produce an annual report on the State of Solutions to Internal Displacement that documents positive steps taken to resolve displacement as well as areas where improvements are still needed.
- The UN should work to enhance States' access to predictable technical support by providing expert capacity to Governments and streamlining technical assistance from the UN, including by using the SRSG's office as an entry point for requests.
- National and, where relevant, international legal authorities should investigate and prosecute those who forcibly displace populations or commit other violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Criminal Law that contribute to displacement.

2.2 Ensure the whole of society is invested

Even with strong Government leadership, solutions to internal displacement cannot be achieved without the engagement of other relevant stakeholders. Making real progress on ending protracted displacement will require drawing on the expertise and capacities of IDPs and local communities, civil society, the media and academia. While these steps are discussed here in relation to solutions to displacement, they have equal relevance for action to prevent new displacement risks and provide effective humanitarian response.

A critical starting point for this **‘whole-of-society’ approach** is recognizing that **IDPs have rights, agency and capacities**. Too often, IDPs are seen merely as ‘beneficiaries’ with needs. In reality, IDPs demonstrate remarkable strength, resilience and adaptability in the face of enormous hardship and have valuable skills that they can and do use to find solutions for themselves. Many IDPs are eager to rebuild their lives and could do so independently if they had adequate resources. Capitalizing on this potential requires all actors to be more deliberate in going beyond merely assessing IDPs’ needs, better understanding their capacities and designing assistance programmes in ways that respect and promote the agency of IDPs and give them a choice about their futures.

Building on this, IDPs and host communities must be able to **exercise their right to participate in decisions that affect them**. Too often, they are not heard by policymakers and are unable to shape their own futures as decision makers in their own right. As we learned in our consultations, this is particularly true for women, the LGBTI community, youth and individuals from indigenous and marginalized groups. One important way to address this is to ensure that, at minimum, displaced persons are able to **exercise their rights to participate in**

“We’re feeling as if we are not citizens of our own country as no information is shared with us.”

Host community member, South Sudan;
consultations for the Panel.

civic processes. Governments may have to take proactive steps to ensure this can be achieved, for example by allowing IDPs to vote in their current location rather than in their areas of origin or easing documentation requirements.⁸⁵

We also believe it is critical to better utilize **community-based planning**. This would not only help to build social cohesion in areas of local integration but also be an important confidence-building and peacebuilding tool in areas of return. To assist in this, we recommend the establishment of **consultative bodies** that systematically engage IDPs and local communities in the development of laws and policies on internal displacement, solutions strategies and plans, as well as peace processes. The involvement of displaced women,⁸⁶ youth and representatives from marginalized groups in these bodies is particularly important. The language used in these discussions should also ensure that individuals and representatives can easily follow and actively take part in the dialogue. **Box 6** highlights how one regional authority in the Luhansk Region of Ukraine supported strengthened IDP consultation.

More action is also needed to **engage the capacities of local civil society actors**, notably local NGOs, community leaders, faith-based

organizations, women-led organizations and other grassroots and community-based actors. The role of these critical local actors as front-line responders and in driving change remains under-valued and under-supported. Despite commitments by international donors, only a tiny fraction of funding reaches them directly. This must change. Civil society actors must be recognized as true partners in responses, including in strategic planning processes. Donors, UN agencies and NGOs should provide technical

and financial investments to strengthen their capacities, including in their management and institutional structures.

The media, in particular the national media, is another important ally. They can be crucial in building public understanding of the displacement crisis and its impact, cultivating public interest and pressure and, ultimately, shaping the narrative around displacement and generating momentum for change. Among younger generations, non-traditional media (notably social media) is key. At present, however, formal media entities are not regularly engaged in addressing internal displacement. In some cases, Governments deliberately suppress their work and block access to social media outlets. The media has also been used by parties to conflict to further their agendas and efforts to regulate or prevent such activities have thus far been limited. We encourage the media (as well as users of social media) to report on internal displacement proactively and responsibly, with a particular focus on sharing human stories that help cultivate a culture of tolerance, understanding and peaceful coexistence. We emphasize the importance for Governments to allow the media to report freely and without undue interference, while also underlining that the media should not be used as an instrument for harmful purposes.

Academia can also be better engaged to inform the public about internal displacement, provide expertise to Governments⁸⁸ and set out a pathway for change. The engagement of academia in internal displacement has, however, been more limited than is the case with other forms of forced migration. This is due, in part, to the limited extent to which academic institutions prioritize this issue and shortages in funding available for these efforts. Moreover, Governments and international responders do not sufficiently consult the researchers and experts that do exist, including those from displacement-affected countries. To address this, we urge academic institutions and their donors to make internal

BOX 6

IDP Councils in the Luhansk Region of Ukraine

Mechanisms for the consultation and participation of IDPs and host community members can take many forms. In the Luhansk region of eastern Ukraine, four regional '**IDP Councils**' composed of IDP representatives, host community members and local authorities were set up in 2020. These Councils, initiated by local authorities with the support of IDPs, the local population and international partners such as the Norwegian Refugee Council, advise local authorities on issues relevant to IDPs, weighing in on measures to address the specific challenges they face. The Councils also provide important information relevant to IDPs – for example, on their rights to access specific social services. At the national level, **IDP Councils undertake advocacy campaigns** to raise awareness on the situation of IDPs in eastern Ukraine. An IDP Council representative who spoke to the Panel explained that the Councils are an **important channel for IDPs to have predictable and regular interaction with authorities**, both to ensure that IDPs are taken into account in regional policies and programmes and to provide feedback to authorities on implementation.⁸⁷

displacement a priority and, more specifically, to expand **networks of researchers working on internal displacement**,⁸⁹ particularly from and in displacement-affected countries and academic institutions in the Global South. New initiatives should build upon and support existing networks wherever possible, while also continuing to explore potential new partnerships.⁹⁰

We also believe in the importance of **engaging society as a whole in driving change**. This

could be achieved through different avenues depending on the context, but one model could be **public dialogues** involving civil society groups, schools, traditional leaders and the media that address the issue of internal displacement. Such discussions could help build understanding and awareness of human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination, coexistence, conflict resolution and environmental responsibility. These issues can also be represented artistically, for example, through music, painting or sculptures.

Recommendation 3: Ensure the whole of society is invested

More specifically:

- States and other actors should recognize the rights and agency of IDPs to drive their own solutions and seek to understand and promote IDPs' capacities more deliberately.
- States and other actors must implement measures to ensure IDPs can exercise their rights to participation, including voting and participating in general community, governmental and public affairs as citizens and residents of their country, as well as in decision-making processes related to displacement specifically (e.g. through consultative bodies and community-based planning).
- States, the UN, NGOs and donors must take steps to ensure meaningful participation, representation, and leadership of local and national civil society actors as key partners in strategic planning and responses and strengthen their capacities by providing technical and financial support.
- The media is urged to proactively report on and give visibility to internal displacement, with a particular focus on sharing human stories that help cultivate a culture of tolerance, understanding and peaceful coexistence; Governments are called upon to allow them to do so without undue interference.
- Efforts should be made to create, expand and support networks of researchers working on internal displacement, particularly in displacement-affected countries and the Global South, including by strengthening donor investments in the universities, think tanks and initiatives that support these efforts.
- Civil society groups, teachers and community leaders, among others, should seize all opportunities to build understanding and awareness of issues related to the prevention and resolution of situations of internal displacement.

2.3 Make better use of the capacities of the private sector

In recent years, private sector actors have increased their engagement and collaboration with Governments and humanitarian actors in refugee settings. They have made valuable contributions towards refugee livelihoods, housing and basic service infrastructure. At present, however, we have not seen this same level of engagement in internal displacement contexts.

From our research and consultations, we believe **engagement of the private sector on solutions to internal displacement could be a gamechanger.**

While during the course of our work we saw situations in which displacement was caused by corporate interests or action,⁹¹ we also recognize the significant **untapped potential for the private sector to contribute** positively to solutions for IDPs. As in refugee contexts, private sector entities – whether local, national or international – can be a source of jobs for IDPs, can assist in providing housing and can use their resources and networks to repair infrastructure far more quickly than may be the case through the Government or the UN system. The private sector can also drive positive change in Government policy. Some examples of these types of engagements in displacement settings are highlighted in **Box 7**.

There are a number of **barriers that need to be overcome** for the private sector to engage more proactively. In our consultations, private sector leaders highlighted concerns about the risks and sensitivities of working in internal displacement contexts (particularly in situations of fragility or persistent conflict), the lack of necessary information and data, including on local markets and IDPs' skills, and the absence of partners or connections to help facilitate their engagement.

To mitigate these obstacles, we believe a number of steps are needed. First, private sector companies (particularly international companies) should recognize engagement in internal displacement settings as not only an issue of corporate social responsibility, but also as an opportunity for **mutually beneficial outcomes** for both the lives of IDPs and their businesses. While strong ethical standards⁹² and rights-based approaches must underpin all work in displacement settings, private sector actors should recognize that IDPs are consumers of products and services, potential employees and future business leaders.⁹³

Second, the **private sector must be recognized as more than just a donor**. Funding is certainly important, and we urge companies and foundations to continue their financial contributions, but Governments, the UN and NGOs must begin recognizing the private sector as true partners and proactively identify and capitalize on their expertise, assets and capacities.

Third, Governments and financiers should work to create **business-friendly environments**⁹⁴ by adopting policies, practices and infrastructure that can incentivize private sector engagement. This could be achieved through support to social impact bonds, blended finance⁹⁵ or insurance mechanisms to lower the risks of investing and operating in such contexts. Strengthening the use of **public-private partnerships** can also support private sector engagement and bring greater efficiency and sustainability to the provision of public services.

To support this strengthened collaboration with the private sector, we believe there is value in establishing **national and local private sector platforms** that bring together companies,

BOX 7

Private sector actors driving recovery and change

Private sector actors and partnerships around the world are already actively engaging in contexts of displacement and contributing to solutions. Businesses are an important source of livelihoods for displaced individuals and have also benefited from the skills and capacities of IDPs. The Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation, for example, is a network of private sector actors that supports IDPs and communities affected by conflict and disaster. In 2018, it organized a job fair that provided 3,000 offers of employment to individuals affected by the conflict in Marawi.⁹⁶

We have seen that there are more examples of private sector engagement in solutions in refugee contexts than in internal displacement settings. We believe many of these initiatives offer lessons that have relevance across all types of contexts. Private foundations, for example, have made important contributions to kick-start solutions and recovery in a number of refugee communities.

In Ethiopia, the IKEA Foundation collaborated with the Ethiopian Government and UNHCR to invest around \$100 million to support livelihoods and infrastructure programmes in and around five remote Dollo Ado refugee camps between 2011 and 2018. This helped to set refugees and host communities on a path to self-reliance and offers models that could be adopted for internal displacement settings.⁹⁷

Private sector actors have also contributed to **policy change** that benefited both their businesses and displaced populations. In Uganda, for example, GSMA (a body that represents mobile phone operators) partnered with UNHCR to advocate with the Government to change the documentation requirements to access a SIM card to make it easier for refugees to access mobile telephones. This type of private sector advocacy could be invaluable in internal displacement settings to help overcome policy barriers that impact IDPs.⁹⁸

government officials, operational actors with expertise in the local displacement context and financiers. These platforms could:

- Serve as a 'marketplace' to help match companies and IDP entrepreneurs with business opportunities, investors and mentors.
- Comprise a standing network that Governments, humanitarians and development organizations could tap into when they see a possible role for a private sector actor.
- Provide a point of contact for private sector actors seeking advice about the context or sensitivities of engaging with internally displaced populations.
- Assist in sharing best practices and providing data to help private sector actors better understand potential business opportunities.

- Serve as a base for identifying where collective advocacy is needed with Governments or other actors.
- Promote collaboration towards mutually beneficial outcomes with full respect for ethical standards and the rights of IDPs and host communities.

Such platforms already exist in a number of contexts and could serve as a useful model. The Smart Communities Coalition, for example, was established in 2018 by Mastercard and USAID and is now a partnership with 55 members focused on enabling more sustainable delivery of services by the private sector to refugees and host communities in Uganda and Kenya.⁹⁹ The Connecting Business Initiative (CBI), hosted by UNDP and OCHA, provides another example. In 2020, CBI supported 17 private

sector networks around the world to strategically engage in disaster responses.¹⁰⁰

Private sector actors also highlighted to us the importance of learning from their peers, particularly on issues such as engaging in contexts of internal displacement, which may be new for many companies. Facilitating opportunities for private sector actors to showcase their work to their peers and their customers could motivate others to engage in internal displacement settings. In this context, we believe that establishing **private sector champions** on internal displacement at national and global level could help mobilize strengthened private sector action. **Global platforms like the World Economic Forum can also be used to showcase private sector engagements** and good practices and generate commitments to action from private sector actors and donors.¹⁰¹

Financers and humanitarian and development agencies should also use their own operations to **support the local private sector**. Bilateral donors, for example, should ensure that their grant agreements allow materials to be sourced locally, and UN agencies and NGOs should commit to local procurement wherever possible.¹⁰² Doing so supports the local economy and reduces the potential negative impact of influxes of aid on local markets.

“If I were given a loan from the Government or an organization, I would start a profitable small business to achieve my personal and financial ambitions and get out of these difficult circumstances...One of my dream projects is to open a clothing and home decor store or a women’s beauty store.”

Internally displaced woman, Iraq;
consultations for the Panel

Finally, building meaningful partnerships with the private sector will also require the UN and NGOs to **invest in building their understanding of the private sector**, including by recruiting individuals that come from a private sector background.

Recommendation 4: Make better use of the capacities of the private sector for solutions

More specifically:

- Private sector actors are urged to seek out opportunities for engagement where they can contribute to solutions to internal displacement.
- Governments and financiers should create business-friendly environments by adopting policies and regulations that can incentivize private sector engagement, including through the use of public-private partnerships, social impact bonds, blended finance or insurance mechanisms to lower the risk of investing and operating in internal displacement contexts.
- Governments, private sector actors, financiers, the UN and NGOs should work together to establish national and local private sector platforms to share knowledge and create opportunities for strengthened partnerships and private sector engagement.
- Committed private sector actors should volunteer to serve as champions at the national or global level on engagement in internal displacement settings, and global platforms like the World Economic Forum should provide space for private sector actors to showcase good practices and make commitments to action.
- Donors and humanitarian and development organizations should commit to sourcing products from the local private sector whenever possible.
- The UN and NGOs should invest in building their understanding of the private sector, including by recruiting individuals with private sector backgrounds.

2.4 Make the UN fit for purpose and accountable for solutions

Ending protracted displacement will require fundamental changes to the way international humanitarian, development and peace actors engage in contexts of internal displacement. While the UN, NGOs, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and other actors are already making important contributions to solutions, there remain challenges that need to be addressed, particularly in the **leadership and coordination** of these efforts. As the actor mandated to provide a large portion of this leadership and coordination, the UN system is the primary focus of this section. Many of our recommendations are, however, also relevant to the work of other international organizations and NGOs, and we hope they will apply the core lessons to their own work.

The first important challenge is that there appears to be a persistent **disconnect between the narrative on approaches to solutions and how action occurs in practice**. This disconnect is particularly visible on two fronts. First, although the UN and the international community regularly reiterate the importance of State ownership and responsibility, in practice, supporting IDPs to achieve an end to displacement is still broadly **treated as a de facto task of international humanitarian actors**. While humanitarian organizations play a critical role in responding to crises and, as elaborated in **Chapter 4**, can and should lay the groundwork for solutions, their contribution to solutions can only go so far.

Second, despite long-standing recognition of the importance of joined-up action across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, initiatives aimed at strengthening this approach have **failed to deliver tangible change** or results on the scale required. Consequently, issues critical to the achievement of solutions – for example,

livelihoods, housing, social cohesion and governance – often do not receive sufficient attention.

Development, peace, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation actors are not predictably engaged in responses to internal displacement and their country teams do not always appear to see themselves as having a responsibility for supporting solutions. As some actors described to us, while humanitarian actors are expected to engage with and adapt to a nexus approach, this is not reciprocated by other actors across the nexus, thereby **placing the burden for change entirely on the humanitarian system** and further entrenching a short-term humanitarian approach.

There are a number of steps that we believe can correct this. As a starting point, we believe it is important for the Secretary-General to **strengthen UN leadership on solutions at country level**. This includes having a clear point of responsibility and accountability for mobilizing a reoriented approach among international actors and ensuring high-level engagement with the Government. Despite the fact that the 2011 Decision of the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee tasked UN Resident Coordinators with overseeing the development of a solutions strategy, implementation has been ad hoc and engagement with Governments on solutions has been inconsistent.¹⁰³ Nevertheless, we believe that the cross-cutting mandate of Resident Coordinators to oversee humanitarian, development and peace activities makes them ideally suited to provide the leadership we believe is needed. The ongoing roll out of the UN Development System Reform also provides a valuable opportunity to strengthen the engagement of Resident Coordinators and the development system more broadly in solutions.¹⁰⁴

To address the implementation gaps observed after the 2011 Decision and strengthen the leadership of Resident Coordinators on solutions, we believe a number of steps should be taken. First, the UN Secretary-General should **formally reaffirm Resident Coordinators' responsibility** for providing leadership on solutions within the UN system at country level and integrate this responsibility into their Terms of Reference and performance assessments. Second, Resident Coordinators need **technical and capacity support** to assist them in carrying out this function. This could be in the form of training and dedicated advisers but, even more importantly, they will need UN agencies and NGOs to scale up their engagement. Agencies and NGOs should commit to leading parts of the solutions process, whether in coordination roles, in aspects of the operational response, or in providing personnel or technical expertise to the Resident Coordinator's Office. In line with this, we encourage relevant UN agencies and NGOs across the humanitarian, development and peace spectrum to form a '**Coalition of Champions**' at **country level** to support the Resident Coordinator in advancing solutions.

In addition to strengthening solutions leadership at country level, it is also critical that all actors come together as part of a **coordinated and cohesive approach**. While there is currently a predictable coordination architecture for humanitarian response,¹⁰⁵ no such predictability exists for coordinating solutions. We therefore encourage Governments and Resident Coordinators to work together to establish a mechanism to ensure strong links between relevant Government bodies and international and national actors, as was urged in **Section 2.1.1**.

The form of these coordination structures will depend on the context.¹⁰⁶ In locations where Government leadership on solutions does not materialize, it is nevertheless essential that the UN and other local, national and international actors coordinate their respective efforts as early as possible to lay the groundwork for solutions.

To facilitate this, we suggest that the Resident Coordinator establish a **Solutions Working Group** and designate a focal point (or focal points) from a relevant UN Agency or NGO to serve as the lead or co-lead. These bodies should bring together representatives of all relevant local, national and international actors, with particular emphasis on the central role of development actors. They should also include representatives of internally displaced and host communities. Where relevant, national-level solutions working groups should be replicated at the local or regional level, including at city-level in contexts of urban displacement.

To ensure that broader coordination modalities do not become unnecessarily entrenched in a purely humanitarian model, the Resident Coordinator should also ensure that an **annual coordination review** takes place, as called for in the 2011 Transformative Agenda¹⁰⁷ and the Handbook for the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator.¹⁰⁸ This review is an important chance to take stock of the potential to move towards a more solutions-focused structure in which national and local authorities and development actors, among others, can play a more central role.

A key basis for enhanced cooperation across the humanitarian, development and peace landscape is strong **joint analysis**. One aspect of this is developing a shared understanding of how internal displacement affects and is affected by the broader political, economic and development context. The UN's Common Country Analysis¹⁰⁹ and the World Bank's Risk and Resilience Assessment¹¹⁰ are useful tools for this type of macro analysis and internal displacement should be systematically considered as part of these processes in displacement-affected countries. Having a strong analytical base for responding to displacement also requires more targeted analysis that seeks to understand IDPs' needs and capacities, specific issues facing different population groups (including across ages, genders and diversities), safety and security risks, and the capacities and willingness of local and national

systems to absorb IDPs. As subsequent paragraphs will elaborate further, this type of detailed analysis should serve as the basis for designing approaches for supporting solutions.

We reiterate our call to Governments to work with the UN, NGOs, international financiers, the private sector, civil society and representatives of displacement-affected communities to **develop a solutions strategy and costed plan** that builds on the abovementioned analysis. At present, dedicated strategies and plans have not been consistently developed and solutions are rarely included in UN development frameworks. Recurrent humanitarian plans and appeals have been used in their place and, while these can and should seek to lay the groundwork for solutions, they should not be treated as the primary vehicle for solutions planning.¹¹¹ In cases where the Government has not developed a national or local strategy, the Resident Coordinator should initiate this process through the Solutions Working Group.

Solutions should also be addressed specifically in the **UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework** and associated processes. Doing so provides a common platform for UN actors at country level, working together with the national Government, to articulate **collective outcomes**¹¹² for addressing internal displacement and will assist in strengthening monitoring and reporting of UN contributions to solutions. Positive examples of this can already be seen in Somalia and Colombia where the respective 2021-2025 UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks highlight the importance of finding solutions for IDPs and detail a series of planned measures.

The UN also needs to take action at the global level. A critical starting point for this is ensuring that relevant actors across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus are more proactively engaged in resolving internal displacement.

We believe that UN **development actors must dramatically strengthen their work on IDP solu-**

tions and recognize this as core to their work on advancing the SDGs.

We are convinced that development actors have distinct comparative strengths in addressing institutional and systemic issues, working with Governments to strengthen their capacities and promoting long-term recovery that is essential for sustainable solutions. Enhancing their engagement is one of the most crucial elements in improving the UN system's contributions to solutions. To this end, we urge the Secretary-General to **formally and unequivocally communicate his expectation that UN development actors step up their engagement on IDP solutions**. This engagement should begin from the very outset of a crisis, in partnership with humanitarian actors, and should be predictable and systematic.

It is not just development agencies who need to strengthen their engagement. Creating an environment conducive for solutions will require **UN political, peace, and security actors**¹¹³ to engage more proactively, particularly to address persistent safety and security risks. In other contexts, **disaster risk reduction** and **climate change adaptation actors**¹¹⁴ will be critical in ensuring that proposed solutions are not vulnerable to future risks and to support communities to prepare for and withstand new shocks. All of these actors already contribute to solutions, but do not necessarily recognize solutions as a core priority in their work and may not have invested in cultivating relevant internal capacities.

To strengthen the quality and predictability of this engagement globally, we believe the Secretary-General should request each relevant UN agency and department across the spectrum of humanitarian, development and peace action to **develop an institutional plan** for how they will build internal capacities and deliver more systematic action on solutions across their country operations. Once these plans have been developed, heads of agencies should proactively communicate how their country representatives are expected to support IDP solutions.

The magnitude of the required changes should not be underestimated. We believe that the UN system is capable of making these shifts, but as previous reform efforts have demonstrated, achieving joined-up action across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus is challenging. While a number of actors have roles, operations and capacities that contribute to responding to and resolving internal displacement,¹¹⁵ there is no function or mechanism that brings these different actors together. Equally, there is no predictable point of contact for Governments on issues related to solutions, or for Resident Coordinators who need support on solutions, whether on engaging Governments at the highest levels or for strategic and operational advice.

The reality is that **despite the considerable efforts of actors across the UN system, the global internal displacement crisis continues to worsen** and efforts to drive change inside and outside the UN have been insufficient.

We fear that without dedicated, high-level attention to this issue, embedding a development-oriented approach and joined-up action for solutions will not succeed. To this end, we recommend that the **UN Secretary-General appoint an SRSG on Solutions to Internal Displacement.** The SRSG would provide a single point of leadership and accountability within the UN system at global level and would serve as a champion of nexus approaches to internal displacement, promoting joint planning, programming and financing across the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding as well as disaster risk reduction/climate change spectrum. As elaborated in **Section 2.1.2**, the SRSG would also ensure **predictable, continuous engagement with States** to promote national ownership through high-level diplomacy, as well as engage with financiers, the private sector and other actors to catalyse effective action on internal displacement.

The SRSG would be an **advocate, convenor and connector**, working closely with other

actors across the UN system. To strengthen the engagement of development actors and Resident Coordinators, the SRSG would work closely with the Deputy Secretary-General, the Head of the Development Coordination Office and the heads of development-mandated operational agencies. To ensure humanitarian action lays the groundwork for solutions, the SRSG would work with the ERC and heads of humanitarian agencies. And to strengthen the contributions of peace actors, the SRSG would engage with the Heads of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department of Peace Operations. Each of these heads of agencies and entities would remain responsible for driving change within their structures. The work of the SRSG would also complement, not replace, the work of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs.

While the SRSG should be supported by an office staffed with individuals with relevant expertise and experience, the office **would not have an operational function** nor lead to the creation of a new agency. This time-bound position would be phased out in line with specific benchmarks that would be developed as part of the creation of the mandate and once a solutions approach is more firmly embedded within the working methods of the different actors across the UN system.

We have consulted widely on this recommendation for the establishment of the SRSG function. It has been met with mixed reactions. Some actors – notably UN agencies and donors – have expressed a preference for using existing mandates, agencies and entities rather than creating a new role. Others – including numerous displacement-affected States and many NGOs – have strongly supported the proposal. Ultimately, our view is that **more of the same is simply not good enough** and assigning additional responsibilities to global leaders who are already overstretched is unlikely to deliver the change that is desperately needed. We are therefore firm in our conviction that a new, dedicated global leader needs to be appointed to help drive change

within the UN system and to strengthen advocacy with States and other actors on solutions.¹¹⁷

Embedding a joined-up approach to solutions by the UN and its partners will also require **action by donors**. As the next section will elaborate further, this begins with them reviewing and, where necessary, reforming their own funding approaches to ensure they are not contributing to silos between humanitarian and development actors and to avoid preferencing funding modalities that exclude national and local actors.

Finally, once all actors have a clearer understanding of their responsibilities on internal

displacement and these are formalized within their organizations, performance should be regularly managed and assessed. This is crucial as it relates not only to solutions but also to responsibilities on internal displacement pertinent to prevention and humanitarian response. We recommend two steps in this regard. First, international humanitarian, development and peace organizations and other relevant actors should incorporate actions on internal displacement into the **individual performance assessments** of senior staff. Second, we encourage the Secretary-General to increase the use of **independent evaluations of UN responses** on internal displacement at country level.

Recommendation 5: Make the UN fit for purpose and accountable for solutions

More specifically:

- The Secretary-General should formalize the role of Resident Coordinators to lead UN efforts on solutions at country level, including by incorporating the associated responsibilities into their Terms of Reference and performance assessments.
- Relevant UN agencies, NGOs and donors should provide Resident Coordinators with capacity to support their leadership role on solutions, including by stepping up to serve as a 'Coalition of Champions' on solutions at county level.
- The Resident Coordinator should ensure an appropriate mechanism is in place to coordinate efforts towards solutions, including for joint analysis and the development of a solutions strategy and costed plan, and should ensure that solutions are included in the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and associated processes.
- The Secretary-General should formally and unequivocally communicate his expectation that UN development actors step up their engagement on IDP solutions and recognize this as essential to their work on the SDGs.
- The Secretary-General should set out clear expectations for all parts of the UN system on solutions and require relevant UN agencies and entities (humanitarian, development, peace, and disaster/climate change) to outline institutional plans for how they will build internal capacities and step up their engagement on solutions.
- The Secretary-General should appoint an SRSG on Solutions to Internal Displacement to provide high-level leadership inside and outside of the UN on solutions and drive change across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.
- UN agencies and NGOs should incorporate action on internal displacement in individual performance assessments and the Secretary-General should use independent evaluations to assess UN responses on internal displacement at country level.

2.5 Harness international financing

Throughout our work, we heard that **financing is one of the most fundamental requirements** for effective action to address internal displacement. Facilitating solutions is costly: where there has been widespread destruction during a conflict or disaster, solutions can require resource-intensive reconstruction and repairs. As discussed in **Section 2.1.1, national Governments should dedicate resources to supporting solutions** for their displaced populations and displacement-affected communities. At the same time, it is clear to us that **international financing can be invaluable** for catalysing action. Not only can it provide States and other actors with greater operational capacity but, in doing so, it can lead to internal displacement being treated with higher priority. Careful use of financing can also help bring about policy change and promote joined-up action among international actors across the humanitarian, development and peace spectrum.

At present, however, **there is a gap in predictable financing for solutions**. While a number of financing channels contribute to solutions outcomes,¹¹⁷ there are currently no financing mechanisms dedicated specifically to the issue.¹¹⁸ We have seen that development financing, in particular, does not systematically address internal displacement, in part because solutions are often not a priority in national development plans and international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral development donors do not necessarily require that solutions or IDPs be given specific attention. Instead, there is an overreliance on short-term humanitarian grants which, in most cases, States are unable to access, do not allow for the more holistic, long-term action required for solutions and do not promote a joined-up approach across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

We believe that addressing these challenges requires a pragmatic and deliberate approach. In light of the **economic and fiscal pressures from the COVID-19 pandemic**, we recognize that significant new funding for internal displacement is likely to be elusive both within domestic budgets and from international financiers. This places a premium on using existing funding more effectively for solutions, while avoiding further strain on humanitarian funds that are already overstretched.

We have looked closely at the potential to better utilize **development financing for solutions**. In our engagement with IFIs and bilateral donors, we can see a growing recognition of the links between internal displacement and development and a readiness to consider how development finance can support solutions. The fact that the World Bank recently released an approach paper on internal displacement¹¹⁹ is testament to this and indicates an opportunity for strengthened collaboration. The approach is anchored in the Bank's poverty reduction mandate and, while it does not include the creation of a dedicated window on internal displacement along the lines of the International Development Association Sub-Window on Refugees and Host Communities,¹²⁰ it does seek to respond more proactively to the medium-term and socio-economic dimensions of internal displacement as part of broader development financing.

Building on these positive steps, we believe that development finance actors (both IFIs and bilateral development partners) need to further **adapt their financing mechanisms, policies and criteria to more systematically advance solutions** to internal displacement. We have repeatedly heard development actors express

a preference for incorporating internal displacement into existing financing to ensure that IDPs benefit from general development assistance, rather than launching specific interventions for IDPs or on solutions. While we understand the rationale for this approach, we also see the need for specific, complementary measures to avoid IDPs becoming “mainstreamed into oblivion”. In particular, we urge IFIs and bilateral donors to commit to **systematically including solutions and prevention of displacement risks within development financing** in situations where countries are faced with large-scale and protracted internal displacement. Financers should proactively raise displacement in their dialogues with States and insist that it be included in national development action.

To ensure greater predictability, we believe that there is a need for development financers to outline concrete plans that set out how they will **strengthen their institutional capacities on solutions and how they will engage more predictably** on this at country level. At a minimum, we encourage all development finance bodies to provide (or seek support to provide) training to their country representatives on the link between IDP solutions and development, and to build this into tools and guidance for country analysis and planning processes. We also encourage the systematic identification and sharing of lessons on how development interventions have supported solutions in different country contexts. Leaders of development finance institutions should provide explicit guidance on expectations for what should be done by their country offices in cases where the Government is unwilling to address internal displacement. At a minimum, IDPs should benefit from broader development assistance and country representatives should advocate for a more proactive approach to supporting solutions and recovery.

The ongoing efforts to support the **implementation of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus**¹²¹ should also be

harnessed to promote a more integrated approach to addressing internal displacement. The DAC Recommendation is a common set of principles to guide donors and operational organizations in implementing humanitarian, development and peace actions in a more collaborative and complementary manner. This is precisely the approach required to deliver better solutions outcomes to internal displacement. Delivering on the DAC recommendations requires donors, at a minimum, to ensure that their own funding approaches do not contribute to silos. Beyond this, however, we encourage all donors, agencies and actors involved in the roll out of the DAC Recommendation to recognize solutions as a prime example of an issue on which a nexus approach can and must be implemented in practice.¹²²

It is important for donors to work proactively to bring about a more collective approach **within the international system**, a point emphasized in the DAC Recommendation. They should use their influence to insist that UN development agencies and NGOs step up their efforts on solutions and call for the systematic articulation of collective outcomes (including as part of UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks) that build on the distinct but complementary roles of different actors. The use of markers can provide an indication of the extent to which humanitarian and development interventions contribute to resilience or solutions to displacement. Donors should also be vigilant to ensure that partners are genuinely changing their approach and delivering results, not just repackaging their current programming.¹²³

We are also calling for **financing partnerships** for solutions between humanitarian and development donors to be scaled up, including through donors making joint contributions towards a solutions initiative or plan. In addition, longer-term partnerships between humanitarian and development finance actors should also be explored. We encourage UN financing mechanisms, particularly the Peacebuilding Fund and the Central Emergency Response Fund, as well

as bilateral donors and IFIs, to scale up their engagement on solutions and actively pursue such partnerships. **Box 8** highlights some examples of recently established financing partnerships that support solutions.

We consider it important that, across all financing pathways, donors **provide funding as locally as possible**. This includes directing resources to local authorities, local NGOs and local civil society actors. Donors can learn from the pilot initiatives currently under way by UN-Habitat, the Mayors Migration Council and others to provide long-term funding directly to municipalities to address human mobility.¹²⁴ The need to provide a greater proportion of funding to local responders and civil society actors was also recognized in the Grand Bargain.¹²⁵ As previous sections of this report have highlighted, progress against this commitment has lagged in the years since. We believe these efforts need to be redoubled.

Finally, even with all the steps outlined above, we remain concerned that without dedicated funding to catalyse solutions to internal displacement, we will not see the shifts that are urgently needed. With this in mind, we explored a number of options for dedicated financing, including windows or sub-windows within existing funds, multilateral ‘compacts’ and dedicated financing from IFIs.¹²⁶ After having analysed the different possible approaches, we recommend that international donors, with the engagement of displacement-affected States, the UN, civil society and the private sector, establish a **Global Fund for Internal Displacement Solutions**. Drawing on the experience and lessons from existing models such as the Global Partnership for Education¹²⁷ and the Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents,¹²⁸ the Fund would provide a **catalytic injection of financial and technical assistance** to support displacement-affected countries to implement prioritized elements of national solutions strategies and unlock the most intractable barriers to resolving displacement.

BOX 8

Learning from recent financing partnerships

Over recent years, new and creative partnerships to support solutions to displacement have been established. One such initiative is the Prospects Partnership, a joint endeavour of The Netherlands, the World Bank Group, UNHCR, UNICEF and ILO, which aims to “shift the paradigm from a humanitarian to a development approach in responding to forced displacement crises”. The EU has also recently launched a Lives in Dignity Grant Facility that will “identify and scale up innovative development-led approaches” to addressing forced displacement. These emerging initiatives that promote a joined-up and development-focused approach represent precisely the type of shift we believe is needed. We hope that others can learn from and build upon these types of partnerships.¹²⁹

Based on proposals developed jointly with the Fund, **financing would be linked to specific and time-bound objectives** the country aims to meet and would be anchored in a strong analysis of the local displacement context. The financing would be designed to **promote national responsibility and accountability** and would be subjected to independent review processes focused on performance and adherence to internationally recognized norms, standards and best practices. The Fund would host, share and disseminate relevant learning resources and become a place for dialogue and peer-to-peer exchanges among partners, experts, practitioners and policymakers. This could bring global visibility to new initiatives and may provide additional motivation for States to become champions of a new approach to resolving internal displacement.

The Fund would pioneer a shift away from traditional project-based approaches to addressing

displacement and would offer a more sustainable model designed to **enable and incentivize transformative change**. Having access to financial and technical resources from the Fund would support Governments to take a leading role in resolving displacement within their countries and help to accelerate progress against global targets such as the SDGs.

The Fund would seek to draw resources from development financiers rather than relying on humanitarian donors and would work to generate new partnerships with the private sector. Likewise, while the **Fund would be an independent entity**, it would maintain a close relationship with the UN system, IFIs and bilateral donors.

We have consulted extensively on this proposed Fund and have heard different reactions. Some State donors emphasized that, in light of the financial constraints imposed by COVID-19, now

is not the time to create new financing mechanisms. IFIs, as discussed earlier, indicated their preference for mainstreaming internal displacement into existing approaches rather than the creation of new windows or funds. Other actors, however, expressed the conviction that unless a new mechanism is established, a critical opportunity will be missed to catalyse action and trigger change. We agree firmly with this view and believe that the Fund would help harness existing funding even if new resources are scarce. We do not see a dedicated funding mechanism and a mainstreaming approach as mutually exclusive. On the contrary, both are needed and are mutually reinforcing. Like broader development funding, resources provided through the Fund would also foster approaches that benefit displacement-affected communities as a whole rather than singling out IDPs. Ultimately, **we believe that moving forward with a Global Fund offers a real chance to spark change**.

Recommendation 6: Harness international financing for solutions

More specifically:

- Donors should provide funding as locally as possible and support municipal authorities and local civil society actors to strengthen their institutional capacities.
- Development financiers should systematically include solutions for internal displacement within fragility financing and articulate a concrete plan for how they will ensure more predictable institutional engagement on internal displacement.
- In line with the OECD DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, financiers should ensure that their resources contribute to a joined-up approach to solutions.
- The UN, in particular the Peacebuilding Fund and Central Emergency Response Fund, bilateral donors and IFIs should scale up their engagement on solutions and actively pursue opportunities for complementary funding across the humanitarian-development nexus.
- Donors, with the engagement of displacement-affected States, the UN, civil society and the private sector, should establish a Global Fund on Internal Displacement Solutions to provide financial and technical support to national solutions plans and strategies, promote performance monitoring and accountability, and incentivize transformational change that enables nations to overcome key barriers to solutions.

2.6 Strengthen the effective use of internal displacement data

We strongly believe that **data and evidence** are key for advancing solutions to internal displacement. We have directed our attention, in particular, to how data and evidence could be harnessed to **strengthen nationally owned action on internal displacement**.¹³⁰ It was clear to us that without understanding the extent of the displacement, who is most affected and how (with attention to age, gender and diversity in particular), the needs and capacities of displaced individuals and communities and, crucially, the costs of inaction, it is not possible to develop effective public policies, plans and responses.

The inputs we received from States, data actors and operational organizations highlighted valuable examples of **Government-led data systems** that supported whole-of-government responses and enabled evidence-based planning, budgeting and action. Experiences from Colombia, Indonesia,

Japan, Mali and the Philippines show that, where carefully developed and administered, national data management systems can provide a valuable platform from which to carry out an analysis of trends, risks and needs of different population groups. These types of systems offer the potential for national and international partners to come together around common objectives and to track progress collectively and transparently against country-specific targets and indicators.

We have also seen, however, that **not all countries are currently in a position to put in place** such systems. The models and approach to engaging with Governments on data will need to be adapted to the specificities of each context, including whether relevant institutional and policy frameworks are in place and adhered to, the levels of Government technical and financial capacity and whether data is likely to be secure and protected.

BOX 9

Data collection on internal displacement in Mali

In Mali, policy and operational responses to internal displacement are led by the Ministry of Health and Social Development and its National Direction for Social Development and are underpinned by a comprehensive and collaborative national-level data management system. Using the International Organization of Migration (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix methodology,¹³¹ the system stores data and information on IDP locations, movements and needs and provides information to the wider humanitarian community and authorities. It is managed in partnership

with international and national organizations and data collection is carried out by a wide network of government and civil society officers as well as IDPs themselves. The data platform allows for further analysis of displacement trends, IDPs' living conditions and the tracking of return and reintegration movements. This IDP data management system informs the Government of Mali's contingency planning and disaster preparedness strategy, its national strategy on sustainable development and climate action and the country's annual humanitarian response plans and appeals.

In locations where the Government has demonstrated a willingness to take action to address internal displacement and to do so in line with relevant standards, we recommend increased investment in **national capacity on internal displacement data collection and analysis**, which we believe will enable Governments to respond more effectively to the needs of displaced populations. We strongly encourage Governments to develop national systems for the collection, storage and analysis of relevant data and to recognize this as a central element of their ability to design, implement and monitor the effectiveness of responses to displacement.¹³² National governments will also need to work closely with local and city authorities in this regard to ensure that they have access to the data and tools they need to be able to carry out effective urban planning. Where required, States should be provided financial and technical support to help them put in place such systems.

While Government leadership and coordination of these systems and processes is critical, they should be managed in **close collaboration with local, national and international data partners** including statistical offices, line ministries, the UN system, NGOs, academia and the private sector. In contexts where the Government has the political will to lead data systems but capacity is limited, these data partners should work with the Government to build capacity and gradually create and transition to systems that they can manage and maintain themselves. National statistical offices can play a key role in this. We also recommend a more systematic inclusion of IDPs in the routine data-collection efforts of Governments, in particular in nationwide surveys and censuses.

We believe that the work currently under way through the **Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS)**,¹³³ which provides an important platform for coordinating capacity-building for States, could be built upon to support these efforts. International data partners on the ground

in displacement-affected countries can also help to initiate efforts to put in place such systems.

Any national data system should be designed to be **interoperable across government departments and operational agencies** and should adopt definitions and indicators that follow the International Recommendations on IDP Statistics.¹³⁴ They should align with other national and international reporting frameworks such as those used for reporting on the SDGs. The systems must also adhere to internationally recognized standards and legal frameworks on data protection.¹³⁵ If the data system is designed to hold personal information (for example, as part of a registry to facilitate the delivery of assistance), actors that collect or manage data should ensure that it will be secure and handled in accordance with IDPs' rights before it is shared.¹³⁶

In contexts with heightened security risks or where the likelihood of data misuse is high, the transfer of any internal displacement data that identifies individuals should be avoided at all costs given that it could create protection risks for IDPs. In such settings, and more generally in contexts where the establishment of national data systems is not yet possible, the role of international actors in data collection, management and analysis will be crucial, including to enable their humanitarian operations and ensure an evidence-based understanding of displacement dynamics and evolving needs. It is essential that **Governments provide space for humanitarian actors to be able to fulfil this role.**

We have observed that the data landscape among international actors is often fraught with unnecessary competition and duplication. To help address this, and to strengthen coordination between international and national actors on data, we propose the creation of **country-level internal displacement data working groups** that would bring together all relevant actors (local, national, international and across the humanitarian, development, peace and disaster/climate domains)

to coordinate and promote greater transparency and coherence in data efforts.¹³⁷ These working groups should be initiated as early as possible following a crisis and preferably be led or co-led by the Government. If Government leadership is not yet possible or appropriate, the UN Resident Coordinator should appoint a relevant actor to lead the working group until the Government can assume leadership.

A key responsibility of the data working group should be the articulation of a **country-specific data strategy** that sets out the priorities of each actor at different stages of the displacement life-cycle.¹³⁸ Ultimately, the strategy should include a transition plan to support the Government to assume primary leadership of data efforts, even if in some contexts this transition may not be possible in the near term. The strategy and efforts of the data working group should also be aligned

with and feed into other relevant Government and UN processes – for example, the mechanisms for developing the Common Country Analysis and Humanitarian Needs Overview.

Finally, we believe there is a need for **increased financial support** to organizations and initiatives that build country-level expertise and capacity on IDP data collection, analysis and management, or that contribute to a better understanding of **global internal displacement trends**. Organizations like the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS), IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix, UNHCR, REACH, the World Bank–UNHCR Joint Data Center and OCHA play a crucial role in these efforts. We also encourage these organizations to continue exploring how **Big Data**¹³⁹ and other emerging data technologies can contribute to our understanding of displacement.

Recommendation 7: Strengthen the effective use of internal displacement data

More specifically:

- Governments should recognize data and evidence as critical to the design of effective policies, operational plans and responses to internal displacement and commit to an evidence-based approach to action.
- Governments should put in place processes and systems to collect, analyse and manage internal displacement data and, when necessary, be supported with financial and technical assistance to do so.
- All actors should prioritize the protection of sensitive data and ensure that their operations and systems are guided by strong data protection standards.
- Governments should provide space for international actors to collect and analyse data necessary for their operations.
- Country-specific internal displacement data working groups should be established, led or co-led by Governments where possible, to coordinate data collection and analysis between relevant data actors and to set out a strategy that outlines the priorities of each actor at different stages of the displacement cycle.
- International donors should increase financial support to in-country data efforts as well as to global-level efforts to better understand internal displacement trends.



CHAPTER THREE

Strengthening Prevention

Mamboro fishing village in Indonesia after the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami. October 2018.
Credit: OCHA/Anthony Burke

3. Strengthening Prevention

The continuous rise in displacement linked to conflicts, violence, disasters and climate change points to the fact that, fundamentally, **there has been a failure to sufficiently address the root causes of displacement**. As Jan Egeland, Secretary-General of the Norwegian Refugee Council and former ERC put it: “Year after year, conflict and violence uproot millions of people from their homes. Collectively, we are failing by epic proportions to protect the world’s most vulnerable. Politicians, generals and diplomats must rise above stalemates and seek ceasefires and peace talks, not guns and grenades. In this age of Coronavirus, continued political violence is utterly senseless.”¹⁴⁰

While parties to conflict may drive displacement inadvertently, in some cases, they do so deliberately, in direct violation of International Humanitarian Law¹⁴¹ and International Criminal Law.¹⁴² Other tactics, such as the targeted or indiscriminate **destruction of infrastructure** and the use of **explosive weapons**, particularly in urban areas,¹⁴³ both drive displacement and prevent returns and recovery. Similarly, the use of **sexual violence** as a weapon of war has both triggered displacement and, due to the stigma and lack of justice often experienced by survivors, can make it more difficult for them to return to their homes and communities.¹⁴⁴

There is **limited or no accountability** for State and non-State actors who commit these crimes. Likewise, there has not been the consistent **political commitment** needed to meaningfully address major conflicts, including **proxy wars** and occupations that contribute to displacement. Despite recent initiatives like the UN Secretary-General’s call for a Global Ceasefire during COVID-19,¹⁴⁵ the African Union’s Silencing the Guns initiative¹⁴⁶ and the UN Security Council and General Assembly

Resolutions on Sustaining Peace,¹⁴⁷ political agendas continue to reign over the common good of humanity.

Efforts to address **climate change** have similarly been lagging. A recent interim report by UN Climate Change found that current trajectories of emissions reductions are vastly insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement target of limiting global temperature rise by 1.5C by the end of the century.¹⁴⁸ According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the scale of recent changes in the climate system is unprecedented over hundreds or even thousands of years and is already affecting weather and climate extremes in every region of the world.¹⁴⁹ As these heatwaves, heavy rains, droughts and tropical cyclones further intensify, the scale and severity of displacement risks are likely to dramatically increase.¹⁵⁰

Cruelly, many of the countries most at risk from the impacts of climate change are among the least responsible for the emissions that drive them. For small island developing States, the threat posed by climate change is real, tangible and existential. Impacts of disasters and sea level rises on these nations can be particularly acute: in 2017, for example, Hurricane Maria displaced almost 50 per cent of the inhabitants of the Caribbean island of Dominica.¹⁵¹

Given that our core focus is on solutions, we have not addressed prevention in as great a depth. Nevertheless, there are a number steps we believe must urgently be taken to **prevent and mitigate risks of displacement**.

3.1 Address the drivers of displacement and reduce displacement risks

While at times displacement is a necessary coping strategy for individuals and families at risk of imminent harm, more can and must be done to reduce the frequency of situations in which people have no choice but to flee their homes. Likewise, as the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs points out in her report on prevention: “Preventing arbitrary displacement is also in the interest of States as it can be less costly and easier than responding to displacement once it has occurred.”¹⁵²

Undoubtedly, the best way to reduce risks of conflict-induced displacement is to **prevent conflicts and violence** from occurring in the first place.

To achieve this, there is a need for genuine **political leadership** and a renewed commitment to a rights-based order. States must recognize that **with sovereignty comes responsibility** and all actors, including the UN Security Council, must demonstrate a **change in mindset** to put humanity first. The international community must collectively work to **end cultures of impunity** that allow violations to persist unchecked. When there are early signs of conflict or renewed violence, there is a need for improved action to support national capacities for dialogue and ensure the UN, other States and mediators rapidly mobilize to **support de-escalation, political negotiation and conflict resolution**. At local levels, peace and reconciliation committees and similar mechanisms have proved to be effective in preventing and mitigating inter-community violence. Where internal displacement has already occurred, it must be systematically addressed as part of all of these efforts.

When conflicts do occur, there is a need to ensure that **military action minimizes the risks of harm**

to civilians and avoids unlawful displacement. This requires clear policies, training and mechanisms to protect civilians of all ages, genders and diversities during conflict, including to enable them to flee safely if they choose or are impelled to do so. At present, these types of efforts remain inconsistent. While some Governments have done a commendable job of training their armed forces on civilian protection, others have yet to take this step and very few have adopted comprehensive policies on the protection of civilians or put in place measures to systematically investigate, track or redress civilian harm.¹⁵³ To improve this, we echo the call of the UN Secretary General in his 2018 Protection of Civilians report¹⁵⁴ and urge all countries to adopt national policies for the protection of civilians that lay out concrete plans and commitments to mitigate civilian harm and unlawful displacement during military operations. This applies also to countries that are engaged in conflicts through coalitions, counter-terrorism operations or peace-keeping missions.

Despite important initiatives like the Human Rights Up Front initiative,¹⁵⁵ **the UN system has also not predictably mobilized or used its collective weight to confront threats to civilians** that can lead to forced displacement.¹⁵⁶ We believe it is essential that this be addressed as a priority across the whole of the UN system, including as part of the UN Secretary General’s Call to Action on Human Rights,¹⁵⁷ and that training and accountability be strengthened to ensure that all actors – humanitarian, development and peace – can and do take appropriate action when there are widespread rights violations or civilians are under threat. **This will require collaboration across a broad cross section of UN actors**, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Department of Peace Operations and

the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, among others. In the case of serious threats, the UN leadership must also leverage the Security Council, treaty bodies and other relevant UN organs, and proactively advocate with States to prioritize the rights and well-being of civilian populations.

There is also an urgent need for **redoubled efforts to address climate change and its impacts**. In light of the overwhelming evidence of the threats posed by global temperature rises, there is simply no excuse for inaction. There is a need for far greater political leadership if current trajectories are to be stemmed and reversed and the lives of current and future generations saved. Governments must urgently reform their policies, industries and technologies to get back on track to **meeting the Paris Agreement targets**. Additionally, States must take responsibility for the global impacts of their emissions, including recognizing the role their emissions and climate change play in driving displacement. They must also work in solidarity with poorer nations to assist them in preparing for the impacts of climate change. Climate change action, including adaptation and mitigation of future displacement risks, should be at the forefront of bilateral and multilateral development initiatives.

Concrete action is needed to strengthen **climate change adaptation** and **reduce the risks posed by known hazards**. This could include reforesting steep hills to prevent landslides, building seawalls and other flood defences, and planning urban development in such a way as to avoid people settling in high-risk areas. Currently, **only 5 per cent of climate financing goes into adaptation** and, of that, only around 5 per cent goes to the 15 countries most vulnerable to climate change, 10 of which have an ongoing humanitarian response and are affected by internal displacement.¹⁵⁸

We strongly urge greater funding to be directed to **displacement-sensitive climate adaptation**

interventions, particularly in countries at greatest risk and those already experiencing climate-related displacement.

We were pleased to see the emergence of the special task force on displacement following COP21, which works to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change. We believe continued, collective attention is needed to scale up these efforts.¹⁵⁹ Climate-smart agricultural practices¹⁶⁰ and ‘climate-proofing’ cities can be invaluable, including for building the resilience of individuals and communities. Governments also have obligations to protect against the **displacement of indigenous peoples, pastoralists** and other groups with a special **dependency on and attachment to their lands**. In areas where climate change and disasters are likely to result in the loss of some land altogether, Governments and partners need to work with these communities to find appropriate solutions.

To help facilitate disaster risk reduction efforts, we encourage States to ensure that **laws for disaster management incorporate displacement risks**, including the possibility of protracted displacement, and address this issue more explicitly and proactively in **disaster risk reduction plans**.¹⁶¹ Vanuatu’s comprehensive National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement provides one example of this and is highlighted in **Box 10**. For now, however, only a minority of States have specifically addressed displacement risks in their disaster management laws and disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation strategies.¹⁶² This is a critical missed opportunity that States should work to redress, and which should be recognized as core to implementing the **Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction**. The Words into Action guidelines developed by UNDRR and partners guides States in integrating displacement considerations into these plans and can be a useful tool.¹⁶³

Many countries experience a **combination of risks** that drive displacement. In 2019, 45 of the 50 countries and territories with new internal displacement associated with conflict also experienced new internal displacement due to disasters.¹⁶⁴ **Fragility, poor governance, corruption, poverty and inequality** can also exacerbate other more acute threats, contribute to

BOX 10

Vanuatu's National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement (2018)

Vanuatu, a country of 270,000 people living on 83 islands, is one of the most exposed nations in the world to the hazards of cyclones, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, mudslides, flooding and drought. In 2018, it adopted the **National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement**.¹⁶⁵ Drawing on lessons from the devastation of Tropical Cyclone Pam, which hit the country in 2015 and displaced a quarter of its population, the policy was developed to address the major threats to the country's national security and development from the increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events due to climate change. The Policy provides for improved **management of evacuation centres**, better support to displaced persons in emergency response and recovery activities and includes aspects related to disaster risk reduction, human mobility, environmental protection and sustainable development. It also addresses urban planning and housing, land and property issues.¹⁶⁶ The policy was developed following **extensive consultation** within the Government and with communities, and a **National Recovery Committee** was established in the Prime Minister's Office to coordinate implementation. Resourcing the implementation of the policy, however, remains a key challenge.

socioeconomic tensions that lead to conflict and limit the resources available to mitigate crises. Too often, however, risks are treated in isolation without careful examination of their interconnections.

To address this, it is important that States and other actors analyse how **risks intersect and overlap** and reflect this understanding in laws, policies and plans to reduce displacement risks. As a recent joint paper by UNHCR and IOM explains: "A holistic understanding of conditions of vulnerability, exposure and risk at national and subnational levels is important for orienting policy and practice on internal displacement." This calls for "appreciating interactions between conflict and disaster – and other factors, such as historical fault lines and marginalization – that heighten exposure and conditions of vulnerability."¹⁶⁷ This nuanced understanding will be crucial in developing effective prevention strategies.

Across all types of internal displacement contexts, we believe there is a need to strengthen investment and support for **early warning and community-based prevention mechanisms** that enable communities and local and municipal authorities to more effectively prepare for and mitigate future risks. Where such measures have been used, as in Colombia's early warning system featured in **Box 11**, they have had a considerable impact. These should be part of a holistic approach to reducing risks that also includes steps to reduce the threat itself. Where no alternatives exist, States should facilitate migration out of areas at high risk or undertake **planned relocation** with the consent and participation of affected communities. Experiences in Bangladesh have shown that these types of holistic efforts can pay off: following devastating levels of death and displacement from cyclones, the Government invested in early warning systems, the construction of cyclone shelters in strategic locations and community-led training that helped ensure safe evacuations to shelters for 2.5 million people when Cyclone Amphan struck in May 2020.¹⁶⁸

More attention should also be paid to **protecting people's livelihoods, promoting community resilience and coping capacities, and drawing on local and indigenous knowledge** to inform risk reduction strategies. Communities often already have sophisticated self-protection strategies that could be further scaled up if they were provided with necessary resources. Tools like micro-insurance schemes and social safety net programmes can also help populations to better cope with the adverse effects of climate change and should be utilized more proactively.

Some of the weaknesses in reducing displacement risks can be traced back to a **lack of financial investments in prevention**. Many countries are limited in the resources they are able to dedicate to risk reduction. These same shortfalls

"If the government had provided security in our original villages, we would not have been displaced."

Internally displaced man, Sudan;
consultations for the Panel

in prevention financing also extend to international donors: in 2017, only 2 per cent of Official Development Assistance to fragile contexts¹⁶⁹ from DAC countries¹⁷⁰ was allocated to conflict prevention.¹⁷¹ Critical preparedness approaches

BOX 11

Early warning mechanisms in Colombia

In 1997, the Government of Colombia passed Law 387 to better prevent and respond to internal displacement in the country. One of the measures called for in the law was the establishment of **early warning mechanisms** to monitor and promote early action in areas with an identified risk of displacement.¹⁷² In line with the law, municipal committees were set up to address displacement issues and were tasked with proposing **alternative conflict resolution options** to avoid people becoming displaced. At the national level, the law called on the Government to promote community and citizen action to generate **peaceful coexistence** and, further, compelled the government to take strengthened **law enforcement** action against "agents of disturbance". An Ombudsman plays a prominent role in the early warning system, collecting and verifying information on risks faced by the civilian population in the context of armed conflict, including displacement risks, and alerting authorities so they can take

appropriate and timely action. The early warning system was adjusted in 2016 in light of the peace agreement between the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and was complemented by a national response mechanism. Since 2017, the Ombudsman's Office has issued **207 early warning alerts**, which helped to prevent almost 100 episodes of forced displacement.¹⁷³

A key lesson from the Colombian experience is the importance of first understanding how communities go about solving problems themselves. Mechanisms then build on this and are **co-designed with the community**. There should be a clear understanding of the **role of each relevant actor** in the early warning mechanisms – from the role of community members, the protection role of civil society and international protection actors, to the expected response of the State, including law enforcement.

like forecast-based financing also remain underutilized, and climate and disaster funds are not being used effectively for displacement prevention.¹⁷⁴

While recognizing that the global economy is currently severely strained by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is, nevertheless, a need for **new funding for prevention**. As **Box 12** highlights, evidence-based anticipatory tools such as **forecast-based financing** can be one particularly valuable tool. Strengthening preparedness through forecast-based financing can help protect against displacement, provide for safer and more dignified conditions during displacement and facilitate more prompt durable solutions. We also believe there is potential to better use **climate change funding** to prevent disaster displacement risks, including through mechanisms like the Green Climate Fund.¹⁷⁵ Consideration should also be given to expanding affordable and accessible micro-insurance and 'climate insurance'.¹⁷⁶

BOX 12

Forecast-based financing and anticipatory action

Around the world, countries are recognizing the importance of investing in preparedness for crises before a disaster strikes. Mechanisms to support these types of efforts, known as 'anticipatory humanitarian action' are currently being developed in at least sixty countries. One tool for anticipatory action is forecast-based financing. This approach works by releasing pre-approved funds for humanitarian action based on scientific forecast and risk analysis. Such funds have been disbursed in the run up to cyclones, extreme cold weather and volcanic ashfalls, and are now being developed for drought and heatwaves. In January 2020, for example, financing was allocated to vulnerable herders in Mongolia based on forecasts of an extreme winter.¹⁷⁷

Recommendation 8: Address the drivers of displacement and reduce displacement risks

More specifically:

- To prevent conflicts and violence from occurring in the first place and reduce risks of conflict-induced displacement, States and, at global level, the Security Council, should demonstrate genuine political leadership and renewed commitment to a rights-based order that puts humanity first; further, they should recognize that with sovereignty comes responsibility and work collectively to end cultures of impunity that allow rights violations to persist unchecked.
- When there are early signs of conflict, renewed violence or threats to civilians, the UN, States and mediators should rapidly mobilize to support de-escalation, political negotiation and conflict resolution, and systematically address internal displacement as part of these efforts.
- States should adopt policies to mitigate civilian harm in armed conflicts and integrate the prevention of forced displacement explicitly in laws, manuals and training of armed forces.
- The UN should mobilize and use its full weight to confront threats to civilians, including by ensuring senior staff across all parts of the system are trained and held accountable for taking action when there are widespread rights violations or civilians are under threat.
- States must take immediate action to prevent a further worsening of the global climate crisis, including by reducing their emissions in line with the Paris Agreement targets and working in solidarity with poorer nations to support them in preparing for the impacts of climate change – including displacement.
- States should ensure that laws, policies, strategies and action on disaster management and disaster risk reduction address displacement risks (including the possibility of protracted displacement) more explicitly and proactively, including with consideration for how risks intersect, overlap and are compounded by broader societal challenges.
- Financiers should dramatically scale up funding for displacement-sensitive climate adaptation interventions, including through channels like the Green Climate Fund, with a focus on countries at greatest risk and those already experiencing displacement linked to climate change.
- Financiers should better utilize forecast-based financing and other anticipatory financing tools that enable greater preparedness for crises.
- States should invest in resilience-building measures, such as micro-insurance schemes and social safety net programmes, that help populations to better cope with the adverse effects of climate change and protect their livelihoods, and should give particular attention to the needs of indigenous persons, pastoralists, and others with a special attachment to their lands.
- Where no alternatives exist to mitigate the risk of harm and displacement, States should facilitate migration out of areas at high risk or undertake planned relocation with the consent and participation of affected communities.
- Donors and Governments should invest in community-based prevention and preparedness initiatives, including early warning mechanisms and interventions that draw on local and indigenous knowledge.



CHAPTER FOUR

Improving Protection and Assistance

Displaced children in Rakhine State,
Myanmar. November 2012.
Credit: OCHA/Nicole Lawrence

4. Improving Protection and Assistance

Around the world, millions of IDPs face critical gaps in protection and humanitarian assistance. This is often characterized by continued threats to people's safety, security and rights, and shortages in food, adequate shelter and other survival needs. The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed further risks, both to IDPs' health and to their ability to exercise livelihoods to support the basic needs of their families.

Protection and assistance gaps should be recognized, first and foremost, as a failure of the State to effectively meet the needs of its displaced citizens and residents. In some cases, State capacities are simply overwhelmed. Even well-resourced nations can sometimes find their systems unprepared or overloaded when faced with a large-scale crisis. Where areas are under the control of non-State armed groups, States may also be unable to reach or assist all segments of the affected populations. In other cases, competing demands (whether security, economic, political or, more recently, COVID-19) push IDPs further down or off the list of priorities.¹⁷⁹ In particularly alarming cases, it is the States themselves that cause humanitarian needs and threats, and simply abdicate responsibility for their displaced citizens and residents altogether. States and other actors also regularly interfere in the ability of humanitarian actors to deliver impartial assistance, which can further exacerbate protection and assistance gaps.¹⁷⁹ Too often, Governments are not held accountable for such conduct.

When IDPs are under threat of violence, **UN Peacekeeping and Special Political Missions** are sometimes called upon to intervene to keep IDPs and communities safe. The critical role of the civilian, military and police arms of these Missions in protecting IDPs has, however, been limited by

resource, training and accountability gaps that these Missions face.¹⁸⁰

Humanitarian actors, both local and international, also play a **lifesaving role for millions of people** displaced by crises. There are, nevertheless, elements of the humanitarian system itself that require strengthening. First, the **unique protection and assistance needs of IDPs are not always sufficiently distinguished** from those of other members of crisis-affected populations. While the needs of both populations may be acute, the fact that IDPs have been torn from their homes, livelihoods and support networks means that they will require a different kind of support, particularly in relation to finding an eventual end to their displacement. Challenges in recognizing and responding to the specific needs of IDPs may be partly due to the fact that **the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) has not adopted new policies or guidance on internal displacement** in over 10 years and has seemingly failed to provide strong, consistent messaging about expectations on addressing internal displacement, including as it relates to laying the groundwork for solutions.

In addition to these IDP-specific issues, we observed other challenges associated with the **humanitarian system more broadly** that have an impact on IDPs. We received a considerable amount of input on this issue, with a number of stakeholders urging the Panel to undertake a comprehensive review of the humanitarian system. While the Panel did carry out research and analysis on this issue, particularly on how humanitarian response lays the groundwork for solutions, the Panel's overarching focus on solutions meant that we did not have the capacity to undertake an in-depth review of the humanitarian system itself. We do believe, however, that it is

important to relay some of the concerns we heard on humanitarian responses and highlight other issues we identified through our research and consultations.

First, we observed that there remains a **lack of clarity and accountability on the roles and responsibilities for IDP issues** among international actors, including for leadership of coordination, advocacy and engagement with authorities. This has given rise to competition and led to both duplication and gaps.

Second, **international coordination modalities too often replace existing national and local systems** and services, even in cases where it is possible to work through them.¹⁸¹ Such approaches not only fail to capitalize on potentially vital local capacities, but, ultimately, undermine existing systems and delay recovery and IDP solutions.¹⁸² We observed that these tendencies to bypass local systems are particularly problematic in urban contexts where the important leadership and resource capacities of city and municipal authorities are often undervalued by international actors.

Third, the majority of assessments, programmes and coordination bodies are still **heavily divided** between sectors, agencies and across the humanitarian, development, peace and disaster spectrum. This has resulted in a failure to adopt a holistic approach to identifying, prioritizing, and responding to IDPs' needs and capacities, and has led to inconsistencies in the articulation and delivery of collective outcomes. Together, this has stalled progress towards solutions to internal displacement.

Fourth, despite the rhetoric around '**people-driven responses**' and the considerable efforts to improve accountability to affected populations, there is still a long way to go to deliver on these approaches systematically. As former ERC Mark Lowcock put it, "despite all our good intentions, the humanitarian system actually is set up to give

people in need what international agencies and donors think is best, and what the agencies have to offer, rather than giving people what they themselves say they most need."¹⁸³

In recognition of some of these challenges with humanitarian responses, and given that more than 10 years have passed since the 2005 Humanitarian Reform, in 2018 the IASC Principals agreed that there was a need for a review of current humanitarian coordination systems in relation to internal displacement. To date, however, **this review has not materialized**. It is apparent to us that not only is such a review still warranted, it is now a matter of urgency.

Another reason for protection and assistance gaps in internal displacement is **shortfalls in humanitarian funding**. There is no data on funding for IDPs and host communities specifically, which is itself an indication of the difficulties on this issue, but the broader humanitarian funding landscape is telling: over the last five years, there has been a roughly 40 per cent shortfall between global humanitarian needs and available funds.¹⁸⁴ This is not the result of a lack of generosity from donors as, in absolute terms, financial contributions have in fact been growing. Rather, humanitarian needs are increasing at a rate that is outpacing the additional funds.¹⁸⁵ As a result, millions of people (including IDPs) miss out on urgently needed assistance and protection. Unfortunately, COVID-19 is likely to further widen this gap, both by creating new needs and by decreasing the availability of aid funding in the coming years.

In light of the significant humanitarian financing gap, it is all the more important to ensure **existing humanitarian funding is efficiently utilized**. In May 2015, the UN Secretary-General appointed a High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, whose report outlined a series of recommendations to better meet humanitarian needs.¹⁸⁶ One of the outcomes of their work was the initiation of the Grand Bargain, an agreement between some of the largest donors and humanitarian

organizations to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian response, with particular emphasis on financing.¹⁸⁷ While there has been some progress on the Grand Bargain commitments, many of them – including on the better use of multi-year and flexible funding and channeling a greater proportion of funding to local actors – remain unfulfilled.

There are also persistent challenges associated with the impact of some **sanctions and counter-terrorism measures**, including laws, regulations and policies that seek to prevent the flow of funds to sanctioned entities or terrorist groups.¹⁸⁸ Such measures, including how they are translated into conditions in donor funding, can impose severe limitations on humanitarian


organizations working to deliver neutral and impartial assistance to IDPs in areas affected by terrorism or under the control of non-State armed groups or sanctioned entities.¹⁸⁹

To address the human suffering that is at the core of the global internal displacement crisis, more needs to be done to close the gap between IDPs' needs and the assistance and protection provided. This will require action by all actors, including Governments, peace actors, the UN system and donors. This is particularly critical in contexts of persistent insecurity or where the Government is part of the problem. In these situations, humanitarian assistance and external protection may continue to be a vital lifeline for displaced populations for the foreseeable future.

FIGURE 2

Humanitarian funding gaps 2012-2020

Source: OCHA, Global Humanitarian Overview 2021



4.1 Strengthen the quality of protection and assistance to IDPs and host communities

First and foremost, we urge States to prioritize the delivery of **protection and assistance to their populations**. This means setting aside dedicated budgetary resources, ensuring consideration of protection and assistance needs when making decisions on security matters or economic investments, and being proactive in consulting IDPs and crisis-affected populations. It also requires ensuring that, **regardless of ethnicity, perceived political affiliation, age, gender or other characteristics**, all IDPs can benefit from protection and assistance. Development actors should support Governments in these efforts and invest in strengthening State capacities for service delivery.

When the Government is not able or willing to deliver to populations on all sides of a conflict or in all areas affected by a disaster, it is essential that it (and in conflict settings, other parties to conflict) accepts help from international actors and **allows humanitarian organizations to operate** in line with the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. States should remove any bureaucratic or administrative impediments that interfere with the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide protection and assistance to populations in need. The **UN and donor States should strongly and collectively advocate for access, including on behalf of NGOs**. Where unwarranted access constraints persist, States should be held accountable through mechanisms and tools such as the UN treaty bodies, the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review and, in particularly serious cases, the UN Security Council.

In situations where IDPs are under threat, it is also important that peace and security actors play a proactive role. In particular, we urge the UN Security Council to explicitly include **protection of IDPs as**

part of the protection of civilians mandates of Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions and hold troop-contributing countries, police-contributing countries and Mission leadership accountable for fulfilling their mandated functions. States that contribute troops and police should ensure that they are adequately resourced and trained, and we particularly encourage them to deploy women and individuals skilled in community engagement. We also encourage UN Missions and peacebuilding actors to work closely with humanitarian and development actors to ensure a nuanced understanding of context and safety and security issues facing IDPs, and to articulate collective outcomes that promote the protection of IDPs and support progress towards durable solutions.

Critically, closing the protection and assistance gaps requires strengthening the effectiveness of the international humanitarian system. Given that the proposed IASC review never materialized in 2018, **we encourage the UN Secretary-General to commission an independent review of the humanitarian system** to further strengthen the quality of responses in contexts of internal displacement. Building on the outcome of this review, the IASC should develop a new **internal displacement policy and updated operational guidance** that clarifies roles and responsibilities on internal displacement. Implementation of the policy and guidance should subsequently be incorporated into relevant evaluations and review processes.

We also believe that some important steps can and should be taken without the need to wait for a review. One such step is clarifying and reiterating **UN leadership responsibilities** on internal displacement. Previous chapters of this report have called for the UN Resident Coordinator to

be formally tasked with the responsibility for driving efforts on solutions. In contexts of active crises, Resident Coordinators also typically serve as the Humanitarian Coordinator. We believe it is important that the UN Secretary-General and ERC formally reiterate that the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator is responsible for **ensuring that the specific needs of IDPs are responded to in a comprehensive manner** from the outset of a crisis. The Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator should work closely with other actors to advocate with the Government for IDPs' rights and needs and ensure effective coordination for the provision of assistance and protection. To support the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator across these efforts, as outlined in Chapter 2, we encourage relevant UN agencies and NGOs (particularly actors with formalized responsibilities under the IASC system) to volunteer as part of a 'Coalition of Champions' to address internal displacement.

It is important that **humanitarian responses lay the groundwork for solutions as early as possible** and

that development and peace actors be engaged earlier following crises. While solutions may not yet be feasible in all cases, and, in some cases, discussing solutions may actually be dangerous if it leads to premature camp closures or forced returns, efforts should always be made to reduce vulnerability, enhance resilience and provide a pathway towards recovery.¹⁹⁰ This requires a focus on respecting and restoring rights, addressing losses, and gradually reducing protection and assistance needs. Figure 3 illustrates how this can be progressed at different stages of a crisis.

There is no "one-size-fits all" approach for how this should be implemented and the approach will need to be guided by the **views of IDPs and local community members**. It is these individuals, in all their different ages, genders and diversities, who are in the best position to identify what they need in order to emerge from displacement. Humanitarian actors and donors must therefore redouble efforts to deliver on the **Participation Revolution** that was promised in the Grand

FIGURE 3

Addressing protracted displacement in different scenarios

Source: OCHA, Breaking the Impasse, 2017, p.22

<p>SITUATION</p> <p>Conflict/disaster has ended.</p>	<p>SITUATION</p> <p>Ongoing conflict/disaster in one part of the country with IDPs staying in an unaffected part of the country.</p>	<p>SITUATION</p> <p>Ongoing conflict/disaster affecting the whole country or areas where IDPs stay.</p>
<p>DESIRED OUTCOME</p> <p>Durable solutions through sustainable return, local integration or relocation.</p>	<p>DESIRED OUTCOME</p> <p>Durable solutions for those opting for local integration or relocation. Reducing vulnerabilities pending return for those opting to return.</p>	<p>DESIRED OUTCOME</p> <p>Reducing vulnerabilities pending durable solutions.</p>

Bargain.¹⁹¹ Likewise, responses should build on the agency and capacities of IDPs themselves, analysis of which should be an integral part of humanitarian assessments and tools such as the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework.¹⁹² This analysis should inform the steps that humanitarian actors take to lay the groundwork for solutions, which should also be **reflected in the Humanitarian Response Plan**.¹⁹³

Creating pathways towards solutions during humanitarian responses will have implications both for the types of programming needed and for the approach to service delivery. On a programmatic level, this solutions orientation requires supporting interventions that will help people to **recover their self-sufficiency**. Ensuring access to **education** is one such area and should be recognized as vital in assisting children and youth to eventually find jobs and livelihoods. IDPs should also be assisted to recover **civil documentation**, which will be crucial for long-term reintegration into national systems. **Protection monitoring** should likewise be undertaken to help understand the unique needs and risks faced by different segments of the displaced population and identify where targeted support may be needed to enable solutions. **Mental health and psychosocial support** should also be provided to help IDPs and other crisis-affected populations recover from the experience and trauma of crises.

Attention must also be paid to **how services are delivered**. We encourage humanitarian responders to invest in **working with and through local systems** as far as possible, rather than creating parallel systems for service delivery. This could include repairing water systems rather than providing extended water trucking or funding the salaries of local teachers and ensuring the inclusion of IDPs in local schools rather than establishing separate learning centres. In most cases, the provision of cash assistance (including through existing social protection systems)¹⁹⁴ is also more effective than in-kind material assistance.¹⁹⁵ While working through government

systems and restoring public services may not be feasible in all contexts because of capacity, protection, or other operational reasons, where feasible it can go a long way in supporting the recovery of capacities of affected areas and ensuring that local host communities also benefit from assistance.

Linked to this, as described in **Section 2.4**, we believe there is a need to strengthen **coherence and collective outcomes across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus**. We firmly believe that it is possible to strengthen engagement across the nexus while adhering to the humanitarian principles, which remain a vital foundation for humanitarian action.¹⁹⁶

Laying the foundation for solutions also calls for **enhanced coordination modalities**. As discussed in previous chapters, ensuring that humanitarian coordination structures at country level are reviewed annually in line with UN guidance¹⁹⁷ is important for examining opportunities to transition to a more solutions-oriented approach. It is also essential to promote active engagement and leadership of national and local civil society actors within these coordination structures and to ensure coordination meetings take place in (or at minimum, offer translation to) the local language.¹⁹⁸

Finally, we believe that continued attention is needed to ensure the efficiency of current **humanitarian funding** approaches. The Grand Bargain commitments remain as relevant as ever – among others, the importance of increasing the use of predictable and flexible multi-year funding, and, as previous chapters have highlighted, the need to provide a greater proportion of funding directly to local actors. We encourage continued efforts towards implementation of these commitments. We also urge donors to create exemptions for humanitarian actors in anti-terrorism legislation to ensure that humanitarian actors can continue to deliver life-saving assistance in a manner that adheres to the humanitarian principles.

Recommendation 9: Strengthen the quality of protection and assistance to IDPs and host communities

More specifically:

- National Governments should prioritize protection and humanitarian assistance in broader decision-making and budgetary allocations, and be proactive in consulting IDPs of all ages, genders and diversities about their needs and concerns.
- Where State capacities are overwhelmed, States should facilitate space for humanitarian actors to deliver neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian assistance and protection without undue interference.
- In cases where humanitarian access is unduly restricted or denied, the UN and donor States should proactively advocate with the Government and hold it accountable through mechanisms such as the UN treaty bodies, the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review and, in particularly serious cases, the Security Council.
- The UN Security Council should explicitly include protection of IDPs in mandates of Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions and should hold troop- and police-contributing countries and mission leadership accountable for fulfilling these functions.
- The UN Secretary-General and ERC should formally reaffirm that Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators are responsible for ensuring that the specific needs of IDPs are identified and responded to in a comprehensive and coordinated manner during the humanitarian response.
- The UN Secretary-General should commission an independent review of the humanitarian system in contexts of internal displacement and, based on its findings, the IASC should update its policy and operational guidance on responding to internal displacement to ensure a more predictable response to the specific needs of IDPs.
- Humanitarian actors should lay the foundation for solutions for internal displacement as early as possible and ensure Humanitarian Response Plans outline how the response will create a pathway to solutions.
- Humanitarian responses should, as far as possible, invest in working with and through local systems and structures rather than creating parallel systems for service delivery.
- Donors should continue to strengthen humanitarian financing by working towards implementation of the Grand Bargain commitments and by creating exemptions for humanitarian actors in anti-terrorism legislation to reduce impediments to humanitarian operations.



CHAPTER FIVE

Follow-up

Father looks out from his home with his son in the Awá IDP settlement in Villagarzón, south-west Colombia. December 2017.
Credit: UNHCR/Ruben Salgado Escudero

5. Follow-up

Our report is submitted to the Secretary-General who, as the constituting authority of the Panel, has the overall responsibility to decide on next steps and take forward the Panel's report and recommendations. We take this opportunity to offer some suggestions.

First, it is crucial that the culmination of the Panel initiative and the launch of this report is not seen as the end of the process of building national, regional and global commitments on internal displacement. On the contrary, **now more than ever before is when action is needed** to bring about meaningful change. Both the letter and spirit of the Panel's recommendations should begin to be given effect in concrete, practical terms. The momentum that led to the creation of the Panel and propelled our work must be sustained.

To these ends, we believe that the **engagement and leadership of the Secretary-General** will be critical in the follow-up to the report and its recommendations and to embed internal displacement as a priority issue across the United Nations and globally. We call upon the Secretary-General to drive these efforts both personally and by motivating other actors to take the required actions and initiatives with energy, creativity and commitment.

We make this same call to Governments, the UN system, regional organizations, other international organizations, civil society actors, the private sector and IFIs. We urge them all to take the initiative, without waiting for formal follow-up processes, to **proactively and resolutely move forward with implementing the recommendations** that specifically relate to them, while, at the same time, working together with other actors

to advance the recommendations that require collective efforts.

With regard to **actions at national level**, we suggest that States task their respective humanitarian, development and other relevant ministries to jointly convene a meeting of relevant high-level officials, experts and local authorities to reflect on the Panel's recommendations and develop a plan for how to take them forward nationally and locally. UN Resident Coordinators, with the support of relevant agencies, should encourage and assist the Government to convene such a discussion.

At **regional level**, we also call for proactive efforts to reflect, build upon and take forward the Panel's recommendations. We encourage each concerned regional organization to convene a **regional ministerial summit** to discuss how the Panel's recommendations will be taken forward within their region. In tandem with this, we hope that regions will take advantage of all opportunities to learn from other regions' experiences.

To catalyse and crystallize momentum for advancing the Panel's recommendations more broadly, we suggest that a **High-Level Event on Internal Displacement** be organized. Such an event would bring together world leaders to review the global internal displacement issue and **make commitments** in light of the Panel's recommendations.

We also believe that it will be useful to continue the '**Group of Friends**,' which has played a vital role in our work by regularly bringing States together for dialogue, to provide feedback to us and to mobilize attention to the issue of internal displacement. Similar convening efforts and

support will be needed in taking forward the Panel's recommendations and, as part of this, we believe that continuation of the Group of Friends (reconfigured and renamed as necessary) will be a great asset.

Furthermore, we recommend the creation of a **small coalition of internal displacement champions** to work jointly on next steps, particularly in driving a more development-oriented approach to solutions to displacement. The coalition would draw together relevant actors from across the humanitarian, development, peace, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation communities.

Related to this, we consider it important to put in place measures to support follow-up among development financiers. To this end, we encourage the establishment of a **Development Contact Group** that brings together bilateral development donors, IFIs and the OECD to support the follow-up of the Panel's financing recommendations.

To facilitate the strengthened engagement of the private sector, we also encourage the establishment of a **Private Sector Advisory Board**. Such a body would help identify how the private sector can take the Panel's recommendations forward by creating economic opportunities for IDPs and local communities, including by learning from successful efforts in refugee contexts.

Together, the actions and steps we are recommending in this report would help to increase

the visibility of internal displacement. In addition, we believe that two specific actions are needed to maintain momentum and track progress in years to come. First, we encourage the United Nations General Assembly to designate a **World Internal Displacement Day** to take place each year in April to coincide with the anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. The Day would provide a powerful opportunity to harness the media, build public attention and provide the space for dedicated actions at national, regional and global levels on internal displacement.

Second, to track progress against the overall shifts described in this report, we encourage the Secretary-General to, as we have recommended in earlier chapters, publish an annual **State of Solutions to Internal Displacement Report** that would be released on the proposed World Internal Displacement Day. The report would be an opportunity to showcase progress and identify where renewed efforts are needed.

Finally, following the submission of our report to the Secretary-General and the conclusion of our mandate, the Panel's Secretariat will continue to support administrative aspects of the initial follow-up and implementation of the report's recommendations for two months and close by the end of November 2021. To support the overall coordination, monitoring and reporting after this period, we recommend that the Secretary-General establishes in his office a **small secretariat** or other appropriate mechanism or capacity for this purpose.

Recommendation 10: Sustain momentum and ensure robust follow-up

More specifically:

- The UN Secretary General is urged to provide strong leadership for follow-up of the Panel's report and for embedding internal displacement as a priority issue across the United Nations and globally.
- All actors should be proactive and resolute in moving forward with the implementation of the Panel's recommendations that specifically relate to them.
- At national level, States, with the support of UN Resident Coordinators, should convene a meeting of relevant high-level officials and experts to develop a plan for domestic application of the Panel's recommendations.
- Regional organizations should convene a regional ministerial summit to discuss how the Panel's recommendations will be taken forward within the respective regions.
- A High-Level Event on Internal Displacement should be convened at which States and other actors make commitments on internal displacement in light of the Panel's report and recommendations.
- The Secretary-General should establish a small 'Coalition of Champions' from across the humanitarian, development, peace, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation communities to support follow-up and other relevant action in light of the Panel's recommendations.
- Member States should maintain the Panel's 'Group of Friends', reconfigured and renamed as necessary, to support the momentum and follow-up on the Panel's recommendations.
- Bilateral development donors, IFIs and the OECD should convene a contact group dedicated to supporting the integration of internal displacement within development financing approaches.
- The Secretary-General should establish a Private Sector Advisory Board to help engage the private sector as part of solutions.
- The UN General Assembly should designate a World Internal Displacement Day each year in April to coincide with the anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
- The Secretary-General should publish an annual State of Solutions to Internal Displacement Report that tracks progress against the overall shifts described in this Panel report and that captures positive steps actors have taken to address internal displacement as well as the challenges and barriers that persist.
- The Secretary-General should establish in his office a small secretariat or other appropriate mechanism to ensure continuing overall administrative coordination, monitoring, reporting on and dissemination of information on the implementation of our report and recommendations.



Annexes

Displaced child in Chasov Iar City,
Ukraine September 2019.
Credit: UNHCR/Oksana Parafeniuk

Annex 1: Background on the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement

On 10 May 2019, 57 Member States called on the UN Secretary-General to establish an independent, high-level panel to examine the world's internal displacement crisis and propose steps for States, the UN system and other relevant stakeholders to "improve their strategies for responding to, and reducing internal displacement". The States, which included countries from every region of the world and those affected by displacement from a range of causes, expressed concern that "international attention to internal displacement has been insufficient in comparison with the rising needs."¹⁹⁹

In October 2019, the Secretary-General announced the creation of the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement.²⁰⁰ The Terms of Reference (ToR) called for the Panel to "raise international attention to the issue of internal displacement and its impact and prepare a report to the UN Secretary-General with concrete and practical recommendations to Member States, the United Nations system and other relevant stakeholders on how to better respond to internal displacement, in particular where it is protracted, and achieve Government-led durable solutions to internal displacement."²⁰² More specifically, the ToR called for recommendations on five areas:

1) Strengthening capacities of Member States, the UN system and other relevant stakeholders to ensure adequate protection and assistance for IDPs, to prevent such displacement and reduce it in view of achieving durable solutions, in a manner that is in line with international law and standards, and as reflected in the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and other relevant frameworks;

2) Advancing collaboration between humanitarian, development and, where appropriate, climate change adaptation, disaster risk reduction and peace actors to better support affected Member States in addressing and reducing internal displacement and facilitating the exchange of lessons and good practices among affected States and other relevant actors;

3) Advancing the participation and inclusion of IDPs and displacement-affected communities in the realization of the 2030 Agenda and, in doing so, being conscious of the specific needs of those who may be particularly vulnerable, including women, children, older persons and persons with disabilities;

4) Improving the collection, analysis and use of quality data relevant to internal displacement taking into account gender considerations and age-sensitive approaches;

5) Innovative financing and funding mechanisms and strategies in support of addressing internal displacement.

Inaugurating our work in February 2020, the Secretary-General called on us to "think boldly, freely, outside-the-box and do what is right," and urged us to give special attention to solutions to protracted displacement. Building on this direction, we have focused predominantly on identifying how nationally owned solutions to internal displacement could be realized more predictably and successfully. While maintaining this primary focus on solutions, we also believed it was important to analyse certain elements relating to better preventing and responding to

internal displacement. At our inaugural meeting, we thus agreed on the key questions for our work and drew up an ambitious plan for research, information gathering and consultation. We envisaged visits to nearly a dozen displacement-affected countries where we would hear directly from IDPs themselves, national and local authorities and civil society. The country missions would be further complemented by consultations and engagements with other stakeholders at regional and global level.

Unfortunately, shortly after we commenced our work, COVID-19 swept across the globe and brought most travel and in-person meetings to a halt. We nevertheless felt it was imperative to hear from IDPs and other actors at the local, national, regional and international level. Our mandate was thus extended by six months to allow us to carry out these essential consultations through different means. Working through partners, the Panel ultimately consulted over 12,500 IDPs and host community members across

22 countries. We have heard directly from national and local authorities; regional organizations; donor Governments and financial institutions; humanitarian, development and peace actors; private sector actors; academics; and specialists in disaster risk reduction. We called for and received over 100 written submissions, carried out over 100 bilateral consultations, organized and participated in six thematic and four regional exchanges and undertook or benefited from 15 tailored research products.

From these consultations and research, the Panel consolidated a significant body of information, which, with the support of our Expert Advisers and Secretariat, we have used to inform the findings and recommendations reflected in this report.

Members of the High-Level Panel

Federica Mogherini, Rector of the College of Europe, former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and former Vice-President of the European Commission (Co-Chair).

Donald Kaberuka, Chair of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, former Finance Minister of Rwanda and 7th President of the African Development Bank (Co-Chair).

Paula Gaviria, Director of Fundación Compaz, former Head of the Victim's Unit in Colombia and former Advisor to the President of Colombia on Human Rights.

Per Heggenes, CEO of the IKEA Foundation.

Nasser Judeh, Senator, former Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Mitiku Kassa Gutile, Commissioner for the National Disaster Risk Management Commission of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Pauline Riak, Professor of Sociology and Deputy Vice Chancellor, Academic Affairs, the Rumbek University of Science and Technology and Chair, Sudd Institute, South Sudan.

Sima Samar, Member of the UN Secretary-General's High-Level Advisory Board on Mediation, former Special Envoy of the President and former Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission.

Members of the Panel's Expert Advisory Group

Chaloka Beyani, Associate Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and former UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs.

Alexandra Bilak, Director of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

Elizabeth Ferris, Research Professor at the Institute for the Study of International Migration at Georgetown University.

Walter Kaelin, Professor Emeritus of International Law at the University of Bern, Envoy of the Chair of the Platform on Disaster Displacement, and former Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the Human Rights of IDPs.

Members of the Panel's Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Panel was led by Assistant Secretary-General George Okoth-Obbo and included Rosemary Addo Yirenkyi, Ryan Arias Delafosse, Caelin Briggs, Giovanni Cassani, Smita Kenkare, Imran Khushnud Shah, Madevi Sun-Suon, Mark Yarnell and Greta Zeender.

The Secretariat also gratefully received the support of interns Amelia Espinosa, Mentewab Kebede, Leah Kramer and Chloe Siegel.

Annex 2: Full list of recommendations

Recommendation 1: Make solutions a nationally owned, whole-of-government priority

More specifically:

- States are urged to acknowledge IDPs and situations of internal displacement and ensure that action to address displacement is a national priority, recognizing it as both a duty of the State to its citizens and residents and a critical step for development, peace and prosperity.
- States should adopt a development-oriented approach to internal displacement, including by systematically integrating internal displacement into national and local development plans and the plans of relevant ministries, and by reporting on how their national development efforts address the rights and needs of IDPs in their Voluntary National Reviews.
- States must recognize that internal displacement is likely to be increasingly an urban phenomenon and should support local authorities to address it deliberately as part of urban planning, including in spatial planning, and make full use of the cities' resources, infrastructure and capacities to contribute to solutions.
- States should address displacement in peace processes, include IDPs of all ages, genders and diversities in associated dialogues and should promote compensation, restitution, transitional justice and social cohesion initiatives as part of the recovery process.
- States are encouraged to work with IDPs, host communities, local authorities, civil society, the

private sector, the UN, NGOs and international financiers to develop dedicated solutions strategies and costed operational plans.

- States should institutionalize a whole-of-government approach to addressing internal displacement, support local and municipal authorities and establish clear mechanisms for coordinating action across all relevant parts of government.
- States should work with the UN Resident Coordinator to put in place a mechanism for coordinating with relevant international and local actors, including representatives of displaced and host communities.
- States should adopt and implement laws and policies on internal displacement in line with human rights.
- States are urged to allocate funds for solutions from domestic budgets, including to support local and city authorities, and ensure that funding allocations are based on current regional and municipality population figures (including IDPs) and the distinct service needs of IDPs.

Recommendation 2: Political will is key and should be catalysed

More specifically:

- Local and national actors, both within governments and in civil society, should drive change and bring attention to displacement, cultivate public pressure for action and hold leaders accountable for addressing internal displacement.

- Regional organizations should adopt relevant legal and policy frameworks on internal displacement and work towards their implementation.
- Regional organizations, with the support of other relevant actors, should facilitate predictable opportunities for State-to-State engagement on internal displacement, where States can present their achievements, exchange their experiences and learn from each other.
- Representatives of the UN, States, regional organizations, NGOs and financing institutions should strengthen their diplomacy with States on internal displacement, particularly to advocate for solutions.
- The UN Secretary-General should strengthen the UN's diplomacy and advocacy by appointing a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Solutions to Internal Displacement to provide continuous engagement with States on solutions.
- The UN Secretary General is encouraged to produce an annual report on the State of Solutions to Internal Displacement that documents positive steps taken to resolve displacement as well as areas where improvements are still needed.
- The UN should work to enhance States' access to predictable technical support by providing expert capacity to Governments and streamlining technical assistance from the UN, including by using the SRSG's office as an entry point for requests.
- National and, where relevant, international legal authorities should investigate and prosecute those who forcibly displace populations or commit other violations of International Human Rights, Humanitarian and Criminal Law that contribute to displacement.

Recommendation 3: Ensure the whole of society is invested

More specifically:

- States and other actors should recognize the rights and agency of IDPs to drive their own solutions and seek to understand and promote IDPs' capacities more deliberately.
- States and other actors must implement measures to ensure IDPs can exercise their rights to participation, including voting and participating in general community, governmental and public affairs as citizens and residents of their country, as well as in decision-making processes related to displacement specifically (e.g. through consultative bodies and community-based planning).
- States, the UN, NGOs and donors must take steps to ensure meaningful participation, representation, and leadership of local and national civil society actors as key partners in strategic planning and responses and strengthen their capacities by providing technical and financial support.
- The media is urged to proactively report on and give visibility to internal displacement, with a particular focus on sharing human stories that help cultivate a culture of tolerance, understanding and peaceful coexistence; Governments are called upon to allow them to do so without undue interference.
- Efforts should be made to create, expand and support networks of researchers working on internal displacement, particularly in displacement-affected countries and the Global South, including by strengthening donor investments in the universities, think tanks and initiatives that support these efforts.
- Civil society groups, teachers and community leaders, among others, should seize all opportunities to build understanding and awareness of issues related to the prevention and resolution of situations of internal displacement.

Recommendation 4: Make better use of the capacities of the private sector for solutions

More specifically:

- Private sector actors are urged to seek out opportunities for engagement where they can contribute to solutions to internal displacement.
- Governments and financiers should create business-friendly environments by adopting policies and regulations that can incentivize private sector engagement, including through the use of public-private partnerships, social impact bonds, blended finance or insurance mechanisms to lower the risk of investing and operating in internal displacement contexts.
- Governments, private sector actors, financiers, the UN and NGOs should work together to establish national and local private sector platforms to share knowledge and create opportunities for strengthened partnerships and private sector engagement.
- Committed private sector actors should volunteer to serve as champions at the national or global level on engagement in internal displacement settings, and global platforms like the World Economic Forum should provide space for private sector actors to showcase good practices and make commitments to action.
- Donors and humanitarian and development organizations should commit to sourcing products from the local private sector whenever possible.
- The UN and NGOs should invest in building their understanding of the private sector, including by recruiting individuals with private sector backgrounds.

Recommendation 5: Make the UN fit for purpose and accountable for solutions

More specifically:

- The Secretary-General should formalize the role of Resident Coordinators to lead UN efforts on solutions at country level, including by incorporating the associated responsibilities into their Terms of Reference and performance assessments.
- Relevant UN agencies, NGOs and donors should provide Resident Coordinators with capacity to support their leadership role on solutions, including by stepping up to serve as a 'Coalition of Champions' on solutions at county level.
- The Resident Coordinator should ensure an appropriate mechanism is in place to coordinate efforts towards solutions, including for joint analysis and the development of a solutions strategy and costed plan, and should ensure that solutions are included in the UN Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and associated processes.
- The Secretary-General should formally and unequivocally communicate his expectation that UN development actors step up their engagement on IDP solutions and recognize this as essential to their work on the SDGs.
- The Secretary-General should set out clear expectations for all parts of the UN system on solutions and require relevant UN agencies and entities (humanitarian, development, peace, and disaster/climate change) to outline institutional plans for how they will build internal capacities and step up their engagement on solutions.
- The Secretary-General should appoint an SRSG on Solutions to Internal Displacement to provide high-level leadership inside and outside of the UN on solutions and drive change across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

- UN agencies and NGOs should incorporate action on internal displacement in individual performance assessments and the Secretary-General should use independent evaluations to assess UN responses on internal displacement at country level.

Recommendation 6: Harness international financing for solutions

More specifically:

- Donors should provide funding as locally as possible and support municipal authorities and local civil society actors to strengthen their institutional capacities.
- Development financiers should systematically include solutions for internal displacement within fragility financing and articulate a concrete plan for how they will ensure more predictable institutional engagement on internal displacement.
- In line with the OECD DAC Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, financiers should ensure that their resources contribute to a joined-up approach to solutions.
- The UN, in particular the Peacebuilding Fund and Central Emergency Response Fund, bilateral donors and IFIs should scale up their engagement on solutions and actively pursue opportunities for complementary funding across the humanitarian-development nexus.
- Donors, with the engagement of displacement-affected States, the UN, civil society and the private sector, should establish a Global Fund on Internal Displacement Solutions to provide financial and technical support to national solutions plans and strategies, promote performance monitoring and accountability, and incentivize transformational change that enables nations to overcome key barriers to solutions.

Recommendation 7: Strengthen the effective use of internal displacement data

More specifically:

- Governments should recognize data and evidence as critical to the design of effective policies, operational plans and responses to internal displacement and commit to an evidence-based approach to action.
- Governments should put in place processes and systems to collect, analyse and manage internal displacement data and, when necessary, be supported with financial and technical assistance to do so.
- All actors should prioritize the protection of sensitive data and ensure that their operations and systems are guided by strong data protection standards.
- Governments should provide space for international actors to collect and analyse data necessary for their operations.
- Country-specific internal displacement data working groups should be established, led or co-led by Governments where possible, to coordinate data collection and analysis between relevant data actors and to set out a strategy that outlines the priorities of each actor at different stages of the displacement cycle.
- International donors should increase financial support to in-country data efforts as well as to global-level efforts to better understand internal displacement trends.

Recommendation 8: Address the drivers of displacement and reduce displacement risks

More specifically:

- To prevent conflicts and violence from occurring in the first place and reduce risks of conflict-induced displacement, States and, at global level, the Security Council, should demonstrate genuine political leadership and renewed commitment to a rights-based order that puts humanity first; further, they should recognize that with sovereignty comes responsibility and work collectively to end cultures of impunity that allow rights violations to persist unchecked.
- When there are early signs of conflict, renewed violence or threats to civilians, the UN, States and mediators should rapidly mobilize to support de-escalation, political negotiation and conflict resolution, and systematically address internal displacement as part of these efforts.
- States should adopt policies to mitigate civilian harm in armed conflicts and integrate the prevention of forced displacement explicitly in laws, manuals and training of armed forces.
- The UN should mobilize and use its full weight to confront threats to civilians, including by ensuring senior staff across all parts of the system are trained and held accountable for taking action when there are widespread rights violations or civilians are under threat.
- States must take immediate action to prevent a further worsening of the global climate crisis, including by reducing their emissions in line with the Paris Agreement targets and working in solidarity with poorer nations to support them in preparing for the impacts of climate change – including displacement.
- States should ensure that laws, policies, strategies and action on disaster management and disaster risk reduction address displacement risks (including the possibility of protracted displacement) more explicitly and proactively, including with consideration for how risks intersect, overlap and are compounded by broader societal challenges.
- Financiers should dramatically scale up funding for displacement-sensitive climate adaptation interventions, including through channels like the Green Climate Fund, with a focus on countries at greatest risk and those already experiencing displacement linked to climate change.
- Financiers should better utilize forecast-based financing and other anticipatory financing tools that enable greater preparedness for crises.
- States should invest in resilience-building measures, such as micro-insurance schemes and social safety net programmes, that help populations to better cope with the adverse effects of climate change and protect their livelihoods, and should give particular attention to the needs of indigenous persons, pastoralists, and others with a special attachment to their lands.
- Where no alternatives exist to mitigate the risk of harm and displacement, States should facilitate migration out of areas at high risk or undertake planned relocation with the consent and participation of affected communities.
- Donors and Governments should invest in community-based prevention and preparedness initiatives, including early warning mechanisms and interventions that draw on local and indigenous knowledge.

Recommendation 9: Strengthen the quality of protection and assistance to IDPs and host communities

More specifically:

- National Governments should prioritize protection and humanitarian assistance in broader decision-making and budgetary allocations, and be proactive in consulting IDPs of all ages, genders and diversities about their needs and concerns.
- Where State capacities are overwhelmed, States should facilitate space for humanitarian actors to deliver neutral, impartial and independent humanitarian assistance and protection without undue interference.
- In cases where humanitarian access is unduly restricted or denied, the UN and donor States should proactively advocate with the Government and hold it accountable through mechanisms such as the UN treaty bodies, the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review and, in particularly serious cases, the Security Council.
- The UN Security Council should explicitly include protection of IDPs in mandates of Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions and should hold troop- and police-contributing countries and mission leadership accountable for fulfilling these functions.
- The UN Secretary-General and ERC should formally reaffirm that Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators are responsible for ensuring that the specific needs of IDPs are identified and responded to in a comprehensive and coordinated manner during the humanitarian response.
- The UN Secretary-General should commission an independent review of the humanitarian system in contexts of internal displacement

and, based on its findings, the IASC should update its policy and operational guidance on responding to internal displacement to ensure a more predictable response to the specific needs of IDPs.

- Humanitarian actors should lay the foundation for solutions for internal displacement as early as possible and ensure Humanitarian Response Plans outline how the response will create a pathway to solutions.
- Humanitarian responses should, as far as possible, invest in working with and through local systems and structures rather than creating parallel systems for service delivery.
- Donors should continue to strengthen humanitarian financing by working towards implementation of the Grand Bargain commitments and by creating exemptions for humanitarian actors in anti-terrorism legislation to reduce impediments to humanitarian operations.

Recommendation 10: Sustain momentum and ensure robust follow-up

More specifically:

- The UN Secretary General is urged to provide strong leadership for follow-up of the Panel's report and for embedding internal displacement as a priority issue across the United Nations and globally.
- All actors should be proactive and resolute in moving forward with the implementation of the Panel's recommendations that specifically relate to them.
- At national level, States, with the support of UN Resident Coordinators, should convene a meeting of relevant high-level officials and experts to develop a plan for domestic application of the Panel's recommendations.

- Regional organizations should convene a regional ministerial summit to discuss how the Panel's recommendations will be taken forward within the respective regions.
- A High-Level Event on Internal Displacement should be convened at which States and other actors make commitments on internal displacement in light of the Panel's report and recommendations.
- The Secretary-General should establish a small 'Coalition of Champions' from across the humanitarian, development, peace, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation communities to support follow-up and other relevant action in light of the Panel's recommendations.
- Member States should maintain the Panel's 'Group of Friends', reconfigured and renamed as necessary, to support the momentum and follow-up on the Panel's recommendations.
- Bilateral development donors, IFIs and the OECD should convene a contact group dedicated to supporting the integration of internal displacement within development financing approaches.
- The Secretary-General should establish a Private Sector Advisory Board to help engage the private sector as part of solutions.
- The UN General Assembly should designate a World Internal Displacement Day each year in April to coincide with the anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
- The Secretary-General should publish an annual State of Solutions to Internal Displacement Report that tracks progress against the overall shifts described in this Panel report and that captures positive steps actors have taken to address internal displacement as well as the challenges and barriers that persist.
- The Secretary-General should establish in his office a small secretariat or other appropriate mechanism to ensure continuing overall administrative coordination, monitoring, reporting on and dissemination of information on the implementation of our report and recommendations.

Annex 3: Key milestones in global and regional action on internal displacement

Over recent decades, there have been important initiatives to address internal displacement at the international and regional levels.

At the global level, in 1991, the United Nations General Assembly entrusted the ERC with coordination of humanitarian assistance to all people affected by humanitarian crises – including IDPs – through a new IASC and a multi-agency approach.²⁰² The following year, the Secretary-General appointed the first Representative of the Secretary-General (RSG) on internally displaced persons, who was tasked with working with affected Governments and the global community to better address internal displacement. In 1997, the Secretary-General reaffirmed the role of the ERC as the primary focal point on internal displacement within the UN response system.

1998 marked a crucial turning point on efforts to address internal displacement at the global level. Following the sustained efforts of the RSG, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were presented to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council).²⁰³ Underpinned by international law, the Guiding Principles set out a definition for internally displaced persons, affirmed national responsibility and presented a rights-based framework for the prevention, response and solutions to internal displacement. Also in 1998, the Global IDP Project (later renamed the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre) was founded by the Norwegian Refugee Council and was subsequently recognized in multiple UN General Assembly Resolutions. 1998 also saw the inclusion of forced displacement in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Over the following decade, additional steps were taken to address internal displacement

at the global level. At the 2005 World Summit, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were recognized by more than 190 Heads of States as “an important international framework for the protection of internally displaced persons.”²⁰⁴ That same year, the Cluster System was created to better coordinate responses in contexts of internal displacement. In 2010, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) adopted the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons.²⁰⁵ The following year, the UN Secretary-General’s Policy Committee issued a decision on durable solutions that sought to establish clarified priorities and responsibilities for supporting the delivery of durable solutions for IDPs and returning refugees in the aftermath of conflict.²⁰⁶ In 2020, States adopted the International Recommendations on IDP Statistics. 2020 also marked the twentieth anniversary of the publication of the Guiding Principles and a range of partners then launched the GP20 Plan of Action and compiled national practices.²⁰⁷ GP20 is now being rolled forward under the new banner of GP2.0, where it continues promoting learning on action to prevent, protect and resolve internal displacement. Measures to address internal displacement are also reflected in, among others, the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the New Urban Agenda. Though displaced persons are not included within the specific targets of the SDGs, they are highlighted as a vulnerable group in need of empowerment in the SDG 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.²⁰⁸

There have also been a number of important developments at regional level. In 2006, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region adopted a Protocol on the Protection and

Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons. Three years later in 2009, the African Union adopted the Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa – broadly known as the Kampala Convention. The Kampala Convention remains the first and only continent-wide, legally binding convention on internal displacement. In 2017, the African Union held its first conference of State parties to the Kampala Convention, and two years later, dedicated 2019 as ‘The Year of Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons’. Other regional organizations have adopted specific Resolutions on IDPs, including the Council of Europe, the

Organization of American States and the League of Arab States.²⁰⁹ In Central America and Mexico, the regional application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (known by its Spanish Acronym MIRPS) includes a Working Group on Internal Displacement that allows for Government officials in the region to discuss and learn from each other and hear from experts on addressing IDP crises.

Glossary

Age, gender and diversity (AGD) approach: Age refers to the different stages in one's life cycle. Gender refers to the socially constructed roles for women and men, which are often central to the way in which people define themselves and are defined by others. Diversity refers to different values, attitudes, cultural perspectives, beliefs, ethnic backgrounds, nationalities, sexual orientations, gender identities, abilities, health statuses, social statuses, skills and other specific personal characteristics. Analysing the AGD dimensions as interlinked personal characteristics helps to understand the multifaceted protection risks and capacities of individuals and communities, and to address and support these more effectively.

Blended finance: A model for financing development projects that combines an initial investment, often from a philanthropic or government entity, with a subsequent commercial investment. The initial investment, often referred to as a concessional investment, accepts a large share of the project's risk.

Civil society: Refers to entities that are independent from Governments and typically operate on a non-profit basis, such as community groups, NGOs, human rights organizations, independent activists and human rights defenders, faith-based organizations, charities, foundations, universities, trade unions and legal associations.

Climate change adaptation: Process of adjusting to current or expected climate change and its effects. Examples of adaptation measures include the strengthening of ecosystems (for example, by protecting mangroves to prevent flooding), promoting insurance and livelihood diversification, or promoting relocation from areas with high climate risks.

Collective outcomes: Concrete and measurable results that humanitarian, development and other relevant actors want to achieve jointly over several years to reduce people's needs, risks and vulnerabilities and increase their resilience.

Community-based planning: Inclusive participatory processes to support the development of an overarching vision and priorities at the local level through a series of in-depth consultations. It provides an opportunity to engage local authorities and community leaders, but also IDPs, host communities, returnees, marginalized groups, youth and women, among others, in the planning process.

Concessional financing: Loans and financing at more generous terms than standard market values. These generally include below-market interest rates, grace periods in which the loan recipient is not required to make debt payments for several years, or a combination of low interest rates/grace periods.

Counter-terrorism measures: Measures that encompass the laws, policies, tactics, techniques and strategy that government, military, law enforcement, business and intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism.

Development actors: Refers to actors with a predominantly development role, such as international financial institutions, bilateral development donors, the corporate private sector and certain UN and NGO actors.

Development financing: Refers to financing across sectors, including energy, health care, critical infrastructure, technology, education, etc., which are critical for a country's development.

This includes supporting national and local governments but also providing financing to private businesses to create jobs and supporting local banking systems.

Development plan: A plan developed by national or local authorities to guide the implementation of wide-ranging measures – e.g., on poverty reduction, affordable and available housing, community development, etc.

Disaster preparedness fund: A financing facility used for the organization, education and training of the population and all relevant institutions for early warning, evacuation, rescue, relief and assistance operations in the event of a disaster or emergency.

Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR): A systematic approach to identifying, assessing and reducing the risks of disaster. It aims to reduce socio-economic vulnerabilities to disaster as well as deal with the environmental and other hazards that trigger them.

Durable Solutions: The process of reaching a state in which a person or persons no longer has specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through sustainable reintegration at the place of origin (return); sustainable local integration in areas where internally displaced persons take refuge (local integration); or sustainable integration in another part of the country (settlement elsewhere in the country).

Early warning mechanisms: Policies, procedures and tools designed to predict and mitigate the harm of natural and human-initiated disasters and other undesirable events.

Forced eviction: The temporary or permanent removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land

which they occupy without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.

Forecast-based financing: An approach which enables access to funding for early action, that can be taken based on predictive analysis and information combined with risk analysis. Its goal is to anticipate disasters, prevent their impact, if possible, and reduce human suffering and losses.

Host communities: Local communities in areas of displacement.

Humanitarian principles: Humanity (i.e., address human suffering wherever found), neutrality (i.e., do not take sides in hostilities), impartiality (i.e., work on the basis of needs alone) and operational independence (i.e., autonomy from the political, economic, military or other objectives held by any actor). These humanitarian principles provide the foundations for humanitarian action and are central to establishing and maintaining access to affected people.

Humanitarian-development-peace nexus: Concept that aims at achieving improved collaboration, coherence and complementarity between humanitarian, development and peace interventions with a focus on addressing people's overall vulnerabilities and unmet needs.

International financial institutions: Global or regional institutions that have been established by a group of countries, such as the World Bank or regional Multilateral Development Banks, that provide financing and professional advice to enhance development.

Joined-up approaches: When parts of a system are 'joined-up' they work together in a complementary and effective way (as opposed to working in silos or isolation)

Non-State armed group: Armed actor engaged in conflict and distinct from a governmental force.

Their size, structure, capabilities and motivations vary widely.

Political will: The intention and commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives related to the public good and to follow through and sustain those actions over time.

Protracted displacement: Refers to the situation of IDPs who, for a significant period of time, are prevented from taking or are unable to take steps to progressively reduce their vulnerability, impoverishment and marginalization and find a durable solution.

Proxy war: An armed conflict between two or more State or non-State actors which act on the instigation or on behalf of other parties that are not directly involved in the hostilities.

Resident: Refers to someone who lives in a country but does not necessarily have the status of citizen.

Responsibility sharing: Concept developed in refugee contexts, it refers to the international cooperation and solidarity mechanism to support hosting States, taking into account the differing capacities and resources among States.

Slow-onset crises: Disasters that emerge gradually over time, such as drought, desertification or sea level rise.

Social contract: Concerns the legitimacy of the authority of the State over an individual. It is an implicit or explicit agreement among the members of a society to cooperate for social benefits – for example, by sacrificing some individual freedom in exchange for the protection from the State of their remaining rights and the maintenance of social order.

Statelessness: The condition of not being considered as a national by any State.

Tenure: In the context of housing and land tenure, this refers to the relationship of individuals and groups to land and housing which can be defined legally, informally or customarily. Tenure can take forms such as rental accommodation, cooperative housing, lease, owner occupation, emergency housing and informal settlements, including occupation of land and property.

Transitional justice: An approach used to address systematic or widespread human rights violations so numerous and so serious that the normal justice system cannot, or will not, be able to provide an adequate response. It seeks recognition for victims and the promotion of possibilities for peace, justice and reconciliation.

Whole-of-government approach: Refers to an approach that promotes coherence across different parts of government and leverages the complementary capacities of relevant ministries, national and local administrations in order to provide a common solution to particular problems or issues.

Whole-of-society approach: Refers to the joint engagement of all relevant stakeholders, including IDPs and host communities, religious institutions, civil society, academia, the media, voluntary associations and, where appropriate, the private sector and industry

Endnotes

1. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), [Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021](#).
2. IDMC, [Women and Girls in Internal Displacement](#), 2018.
3. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, [Persons with disabilities in the context of internal displacement](#), A/HRC/44/41, May 2020, para 17.
4. IDMC, [Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021](#).
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. When areas become engulfed in conflict and violence, people often have no choice but to flee their homes in search of safety and to be able to meet their basic needs. In many instances, people also flee pre-emptively to seek safety before violence reaches an area. In particularly egregious cases, forced displacement is used as a deliberate strategy and tactic of parties to conflict – in direct violation of International Humanitarian Law.
10. IDMC, [Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021](#).
11. A 'mega-project' may include the construction of infrastructure, including large dams, as well as the 'clearing out' of areas in preparation for major sporting events.
12. There is no commonly agreed definition of what constitutes 'protracted' internal displacement. Some organizations use three years or more as a threshold, while others use five years or more. To facilitate a better understanding of the scope of this problem, we encourage relevant actors (notably data actors) to come together and agree on a common definition.
13. Recent analysis found that the average length of civil wars more than doubled between 1991 and 2015. See United Nations/World Bank, [Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict](#), 2018.
14. IDMC, [Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021](#).
15. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, [Rights of internally displaced persons](#), A/73/173, July 2018.
16. A recent study in Colombia and Liberia found that displaced women reported 40-55% greater odds of experiencing intimate partner violence in the past year compared to their non-displaced counterparts. Jocelyn Kelly, Amalia Rubin, Uche Ekhatator-Mobayode, Diana J. Arango, *The Risk that Travels with You: Links between Forced Displacement, Conflict and Intimate Partner Violence in Colombia and Liberia*. See "Overview: Policy Implications of the Gender Dimensions of Forced Displacement Research Program" and World Bank and Policy Research Working Paper, forthcoming.
17. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, [Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement](#), E/CN.4/1998/53/Add, 11 February 1998.
18. Walter Kälin, Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement, [The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement - Annotations](#), revised edition, 2008.
19. UNICEF, [Lost at Home: The risks and challenges for internally displaced children and actions needed to protect them](#), May 2020, p. 5.
20. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, [Housing, land and property issues in the context of internal displacement](#), A/HRC/47/371, April 2021.
21. Recent research in Darfur for the World Bank found that IDPs are 22 per cent more likely to be poor than non-displaced individuals. See Tilman Brück and Wolfgang Stojetz, "The double burden of female protracted displacement: Survey evidence on gendered livelihoods in El Fasher, Darfur", in *Overview: Policy Implications of the*

Gender Dimensions of Forced Displacement Research Program, forthcoming; and *World Bank and Policy Research Working Papers*, forthcoming.

22. The Academy of Medical Sciences, [Health and Internal Displacement](#), February 2021.
23. Norwegian Refugee Council, [NRC Submission to the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement](#), May 2020, para 15.
24. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, [Persons with disabilities in the context of internal displacement](#), A/HRC/44/41, May 2020, para 17.
25. Minority Rights Group International, [No escape from discrimination: minorities, indigenous peoples and the crisis of displacement](#), December 2017, p. 2, para 1.
26. UNDP/SOAS University of London, [Towards Development Solutions to Internal Displacement: A Political Economy Approach](#), June 2021.
27. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by all United Nations Member States in 2015, provides a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet. The [17 SDGs](#) are an urgent call for action by all countries to address issues ranging from poverty to climate change. See also analysis on the intersection of displacement and the SDGs in: United Nations Association–United Kingdom (UNA-UK), [Tackling internal displacement through the SDGs](#), March 2017; and International Peace Institute, [Reaching Internally Displaced Persons to achieve the 2030 Agenda](#), November 2018.
28. Paulo Verme and Kirsten Schuettler, [The Impact of Forced Displacement on host communities: A review of the empirical literature in economics](#), World Bank publication, February 2019.
29. See Annex 3 for additional background on global and regional milestones in addressing internal displacement.
30. Several written submissions to the Panel emphasized the importance of understanding the cost of exclusion as key to political will – see, for example, [UNHCR's submission](#).
31. See glossary for the definition of these terms.
32. International Peace Institute, [Reaching Internally Displaced Persons to achieve the 2030 Agenda](#), November 2018.
33. For mortality figures, see John Hopkins [Coronavirus Resource Center](#) and for poverty increase see World Bank Blogs, [Updated estimates of the impact of COVID-19 on global poverty: Turning the corner on the pandemic in 2021?](#), 24 June 2021.
34. In Iraq, many IDPs were unable to pay their rent and, faced with the risk of eviction, resorted to selling their assets, going further into debt and to child labour. In Afghanistan, the economic recession and price commodity increases pushed IDPs further into poverty and food insecurity. Many of them resorted to early and forced marriages, child labour and begging, increasing the risk of violence and abuse; see IDMC, [Global Report on Internal Displacement 2021](#), p.72.
35. An analysis in October 2020 showed that developing countries were set to lose almost a trillion dollars in 2020 (with combined falls in foreign direct investment, development assistance, remittances, tourism receipts and government revenue) – a loss that will be sustained for many years to come. Global donors are facing increasing pressures to use resources to respond to economic needs at home, leaving less aid available for displacement-affected countries. The same analysis found that between 2019 and 2020, bilateral donors have decreased aid commitments by approximately 36 per cent.
36. Research by IDMC found that the risk of being displaced due to earthquakes, storms, droughts and floods has more than doubled since the 1970s. See IDMC, [Global Estimates 2015: People Displaced by Disasters](#), July 2015, p. 8.
37. The World Bank defines 'internal climate migrants' as people who move within national borders due to the slow-onset impacts of climate change on livelihoods, owing to shifts in water availability and crop productivity, or to factors such as sea level rise or storm surge. Many of these people would be covered by the definition of an internally displaced person as per the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

38. World Bank, [Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration](#), 2018. The three regions included in the estimated figure are sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America.
39. In the 2019-2020 fire season in Australia, for example, 17 million hectares of land were burned and over 65,000 people were forced to evacuate and flee their homes. In the aftermath of the event, [analysis](#) by an international team of scientists concluded that the risk of bushfires in Australia has increased by 30% over the past 100 years as a result of climate change.
40. Joint Meeting of the Economic and Social Council and the Peacebuilding Commission, [Linkages between Climate Change and Challenges to Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace in the Sahel](#), 13 November 2018.
41. Tuvalu, for example, is expected to be entirely submerged by sea level rise and coastal erosion within the next 50 to 100 years, with two of its nine islands already on the brink and the rest sitting an average of only three metres above sea level. Along with Fiji and Kiribati, it has been forced to initiate pre-emptive relocations and 'voluntary retreat' programmes to protect its communities. See Eleanor Ainge Roy, [One day we'll disappear': Tuvalu's sinking islands](#), The Guardian, May 2019; and Carol Farbotko, [No Retreat: Climate Change and Voluntary Immobility in the Pacific Islands](#), Migration Policy Institute, June 2018, para 11.
42. United Nations Secretary-General, [Secretary-General's video message to the First Climate Vulnerable Finance Summit](#), July 2021.
43. In light of the COVID-19 travel restrictions, the Panel was unable to carry out missions to displacement-affected countries. Instead, UN agencies and NGOs carried out consultations on the Panel's behalf, reaching more than 12,500 IDPs and host community members across 22 countries. You can see the list of countries and a [summary of the findings from these consultations](#) on the Panel's website. The International Committee of the Red Cross also facilitated a discussion between Panel Members and IDPs in South Sudan.
44. Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit, [One humanity: shared responsibility](#), A/70/709, February 2016, p. 22-24 & 54-55.
45. Inter-Agency Standing Committee, [IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons](#), April 2010.
46. Dr. Elizabeth Ferris, [Durable Solutions for IDPs](#), August 2020.
47. Currently, over half of the world's population lives in cities, and this proportion is projected to increase to 68 per cent by 2050. Urban displacement trends are likely to continue increasing in tandem. The region with the most IDPs, sub-Saharan Africa, has the lowest proportion of people living in urban areas but is the one urbanizing the fastest. It is therefore likely that displaced people will increasingly move to cities there too, and even accelerate urbanization trends. See Earle et al., [When Internal Displacement Meets Urbanization: Making Cities Work for Internally Displaced People](#), Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 38, Issue 4 (December 2020), pp. 494-506; and ICRC, [Displaced in Cities: Experiencing and Responding to Urban Internal Displacement Outside Camps](#), June 2020.
48. IASC, [IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons](#), April 2010.
49. As the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs explained: "Far too often, political interests determine government policies to favour a type of solution over another, and authorities push through with plans that might not meet the required standards.[...] In such situations, government policies have often imposed returns as the preferred solution to internal displacement, depriving internally displaced persons of their right to choose the durable solution of their preference, and leading to situations where sustainable reintegration was not possible." See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, "The prevention of arbitrary displacement in situations of armed conflict and generalized violence" (forthcoming).
50. While our report uses 'IDPs' as shorthand, it should always be understood to include attention

to the differentiated experiences of people of all ages, genders and diversities.

51. Among other elements, these protection considerations will need to be reflected in how international actors partner with Governments – particularly in contexts where the State is party to conflict or implicated in rights violations. The IASC has developed a helpful typology of engagement scenarios that considers how best to engage with Government actors depending on their role in the crisis. While the IASC is focused on humanitarian response, this can also be helpful in considering engagement strategies for internal displacement solutions.
52. Today's IDPs may become tomorrow's refugees, and returning migrants and refugees may become IDPs if a lack of safety, security and opportunities for reintegration persists in their country of origin. See David Cantor and Jacob Ochieng Apollo, [Internal Displacement, International Migration and Refugee Flows: Connecting the Dots](#), Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 39, Issue 4, December 2020, pp. 647-664; and IDMC, [The Displacement Continuum](#), June 2020.
53. This was one of the most prevalent issues raised by IDPs in our consultations with them. See [Summary of Key Trends from Consultations with IDPs and Host Communities 2020](#).
54. According to a Georgetown University/IOM study on IDPs' in Iraq, for example, most returnees working in agriculture struggled to find employment due to challenges in raising money for necessary repairs and investments, as well as the presence of unexploded ordinance. See IOM Iraq and Georgetown University, [Access to Durable Solutions Among IDPs in Iraq: Four Years in Displacement](#), 2019, p.30-32.
55. International Labour Organization, [Submission to the SG High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement](#), May 2020.
56. During the 2018 earthquake and tsunami in Sulawesi, Indonesia, for example, large swathes of land were simply liquified. See REACH, [Central Sulawesi Earthquake, Tsunami, and Liquefaction: Population Needs – Multi-Sector Needs Assessment](#), Executive Summary Report, February 2019.
57. A related challenge is that "In situations of repeated waves of displacement over many years, overlapping property claims can make restitution difficult." See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, [Housing, land and property issues in the context of internal displacement](#), A/HRC/47/37, May 2021.
58. See additional details in the [ILO submission](#) to the Panel.
59. UNICEF/IDMC, [Equitable access to quality education for internally displaced children](#), July 2019.
60. Community-based education refers to an approach whereby education is provided by a non-government actor but where the curriculum is designed to align with the national system. See [Save the Children's submission](#) to the Panel.
61. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, [Protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons](#), A/70/334, August 2015, para 19.
62. For more information on steps Governments can and should take to address internal displacement, see the Brookings Institution's publication, [Addressing Internal Displacement: A Framework for National Responsibility](#), 2005.
63. Plans addressing the adverse impacts of climate change should also include strengthened efforts to address durable solutions to internal displacement, as per the [Recommendations from the report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts on integrated approaches to averting, minimizing and addressing displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change](#) adopted by COP21 in 2018.
64. The Voluntary National Review is a process through which countries assess and present progress made towards achieving the SDGs and the pledge to 'leave no one behind'.
65. See further analysis in the [joint submission of IIED, JIPS and UN-Habitat](#) to the Panel.
66. For additional information on responding to urban internal displacement, see UN-Habitat, Institute

for Environment and Development and Joint Internal Displacement Profiling Service, [Internal Displacement in an Increasingly Urbanized World: Synthesis report on urban internal displacement](#), May 2021; UNSG's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, UN-Habitat, IIED and JIPS, [Event Report – Internal Displacement in an Increasingly Urbanized World: Challenges and Opportunities](#), April 2021.

67. Consultation between the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement and the Municipality of Honduras, internal report, 29 March 2021.
68. In one analysis in Pakistan, researchers found that, overall, both men and women across different ages had positive feelings about the changes in gender relations that had occurred during displacement, such as increased schooling of girls, women earning wages and husbands contributing to home responsibilities. See Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, [Changing gender relations on return from displacement to the newly merged districts of Pakistan](#), October 2020.
69. Global Protection Cluster, [Global Database on IDP Laws and Policies](#), 2021.
70. Phil Orchard, "Protecting the Internally Displaced: Rhetoric and Reality", Routledge Global Institutions Series, 2018.
71. The critical role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding initiatives is well recognized and was formally reaffirmed by the UN Security Council in 2000 in [S/Res/1325](#), but there is a need to redouble efforts to support women's participation in these processes. This is a core part of the global Women, Peace and Security agenda.
72. Donald Steinberg, [Bringing Displaced Persons into Peace Processes: Good for Them, Good for Peace](#), International Crisis Group, April 2010.
73. There are some good examples that can be drawn upon: Colombia's Peace Accord, for example, addresses IDPs, as does South Sudan's recent Juba Peace Agreement.
74. Additional information on transitional justice in contexts of internal displacement can be found in the [2018 report](#) of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, A/73/173.
75. Some States have already made considerable efforts in this regard. The Government of Tuvalu, for example, set up the [Tuvalu Survival Fund](#) in 2015 to ensure the Government could provide immediate assistance to people affected by disasters and climate change.
76. GP20, [Somalia Data and Analysis to Inform Collaborative Approaches to Finding Durable Solutions](#), 2020; and [Somalia's submission](#) to the Panel.
77. The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs delivered a [report on the role of national human rights institutions](#) in protecting IDP rights, which included valuable recommendations for NHRIs and national Governments, all of which the Panel supports.
78. Examples from multiple countries in Latin America have shown the critical role local civil society actors can play in catalysing change – whether in documenting the displacement problem (as was the case in [Mexico](#)) or in using strategic litigation to compel Government attention and action (as was the case in [El Salvador](#)). Civil society actors, including faith leaders, can also play an essential role in peacebuilding and supporting the recovery of social cohesion following crises (as set out in the Secretary-General's report on [Peacebuilding and sustaining peace](#), A/74/976–S/2020/773, 2020).
79. Most recently in [El Salvador](#) following a 2018 ruling by the Constitutional Court and, notably, in [Colombia](#) where a 2004 Constitutional Court ruling set in motion the development of a [Victim's Law](#) and comprehensive response strategy.
80. African Union, [Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa \(Kampala Convention\)](#), 2009.
81. See, for example, Council of Europe [Recommendation 6](#) of the Committee of Ministers to Member States (2006); Organization of American States [Resolution 2850](#) on IDPs (2014); and League of Arab States Resolution 761 (2016).
82. We heard from affected States about the unique benefits of learning from other countries that

have experienced displacement and have made progress on addressing it. Regional organizations also noted that they have often found States to be more responsive to insights offered by their peers than from 'outside' experts.

83. GP2.0 is a multi-stakeholder initiative that has succeeded the three-year GP20 Plan of Action that was launched to mark the 20-year anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.
84. An analysis of how internal displacement has been addressed by international accountability mechanisms, including by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and by the Universal Periodic Review found that only a small number of recommendations were issued to States in regard to internal displacement – in contrast, for example, to the ones issued in the context of refugees and asylum seekers. See Plan International/ World Vision, [Realizing National Accountability and International Responsibility: InterAgency Submission to the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement](#), April 2021.
85. In Colombia, the Victim's Law specifically mandates a participation role for IDPs. This is a good practice that could be built upon in other countries.
86. IDP women often face distinct barriers to participation in decision-making. See UNHCR, [Tearing Down the Walls: Confronting the Barriers to Internally Displaced Women & Girls' Participation in Humanitarian Settings](#), 2019.
87. See [submission by the Luhansk Regional State Administration](#) to the Panel.
88. In Sudan, for example, Khartoum University and the German University of Amman provided support to the State Ministry of Planning in drafting a Special Regional Strategy Plan and urban plans. For additional details see OCHA, [Reducing Protracted Internal Displacement](#), June 2019.
89. The [Global Academic Interdisciplinary Network](#), which emerged from the Global Compact on Refugees, is a useful model for bringing academics, policymakers, practitioners and other experts together for consistent engagement.
90. The Panel benefited from research and analysis through a pro-bono partnership with the University of London Refugee Law Initiative's [Internal Displacement Research Programme](#). The programme facilitates [regional networks of researchers](#) in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East on internal displacement.
91. For example, extractive industries and large infrastructure development that sometimes drive communities off their land.
92. See, for example, the [UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights](#).
93. Alexander Betts, "IDP Economies: Towards a Research and Policy Agenda, Submission to the Panel" (unpublished), September 2020.
94. See [submission by UNHCR](#) to the Panel.
95. Blended finance is usually a combination of concessional financing and commercial funding that is facilitated by international financial institutions.
96. See [submission by CBI](#) to the Panel.
97. Alexander Betts, Raphael Bradenbrink, Jonathan Greenland, Naohiko Omata and Olivier Sterck, [Refugee Economies in Dollo Ado: Development Opportunities in a Border Region of Ethiopia](#), Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 4 October 2019.
98. Panel consultation with GSMA, 2020.
99. See the [Smart Communities Coalition website](#) for more information.
100. See the [CBI submission](#) to the SG High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement for more information.
101. These commitments should, at minimum, reflect the 10 principles of the [Global Compact](#), but should preferably go above and beyond to include specific commitments towards helping resolve internal displacement.
102. The World Food Programme, for example, has pledged to source 10 per cent of its food purchases from smallholder farmers and is currently procuring food from smallholders in 29 countries. See [WFP Smallholder Market Support](#).

- 103.** The Panel has identified a number of inter-related challenges that it believes prevented more systematic delivery of the 2011 Decision. To begin with, solutions were not formally integrated as a responsibility in the Terms of Reference of Resident Coordinators following the 2011 Decision, and support to help Resident Coordinators fulfil this function was limited. The Early Recovery Cluster, which together with the Protection Cluster was meant to serve as a key support mechanism for the Resident Coordinator on solutions, experienced difficulties in many contexts and was finally abandoned globally. Placing responsibility for solutions with the Clusters also meant that solutions were treated as a humanitarian task, which further entrenched short-term approaches and let development, peace and other actors largely off the hook. There was likewise little accountability for Resident Coordinators that failed to make solutions a priority. More recently, solutions to internal displacement was not directly addressed in the UN Development System Reform.
- 104.** In response to the December 2016 [General Assembly Resolution 71/243](#), the Secretary-General set out to reposition the UN Development System (UNDS) to deliver on the 2030 Agenda through the following measures: 1) reinvigorate the Resident Coordinator system; 2) provide strategic direction, oversight and accountability for system-wide results and 3) propose new funding arrangements for the UNDS. Additionally, the UNDS reform offered an opportunity for increased coordination and planning between humanitarian and development actors. These proposals were endorsed by the General Assembly in May 2018.
- 105.** The Cluster System was established in 2005 as part of a humanitarian reform to enhance predictability, accountability and partnership in responding to non-refugee crises. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations, both UN and non-UN, in each of the main sectors of humanitarian action – e.g., water, health and logistics. They are designated by the IASC and are responsible for coordination.
- 106.** In Somalia, for example, the Federal Government and the Resident Coordinator launched a [Durable Solutions Initiative](#) based on “strong Government leadership and collective efforts from humanitarian, development and state-/peacebuilding partners and with the inclusion of displacement-affected communities themselves”.
- 107.** See the 2011 Inter-Agency Standing Committee [Transformative Agenda](#) and the 2015 [Cluster Coordination Reference Module](#).
- 108.** [Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Leadership in Action: Handbook for the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, 2021](#).
- 109.** The [UN Common Country Analysis](#) is the UN system’s independent, impartial and collective assessment and analysis of a country’s situation. It is used internally for developing the Cooperation Framework. It examines progress, gaps, opportunities and bottlenecks in regard to a country’s commitment to achieving the 2030 Agenda, UN norms and standards and the principles of the UN Charter, as reflected in the UN Cooperation Framework Guiding Principles.
- 110.** The Risk and Resilience Assessment is a diagnostic tool used by the World Bank to inform their country-level strategy documents. It aims to identify the contextual risks that contribute to fragility. See [How is the World Bank Group tailoring its approach in countries experiencing Fragility, Conflict and Violence?](#)
- 111.** The overreliance on humanitarian appeals to fill this function has resulted in both a failure to effectively deliver solutions and the further draining of the humanitarian response of its already insufficient funds.
- 112.** A collective outcome is a concrete and measurable result that humanitarian, development and other relevant actors want to achieve jointly over a period of three-five years to reduce people’s needs, risks and vulnerabilities and increase their resilience.
- 113.** Including the United Security Council, but also the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the UN Department of Peace Operations, among others.

- 114.** Including the UN Office for Disaster Reduction (UNDRR) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), among others.
- 115.** Such as the ERC, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs and UN agencies and offices, including the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization of Migration (IOM), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF); the UN Development Coordination Office (DCO), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UN-Habitat, the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the International Labour Organization (ILO).
- 116.** For more detail on this proposal, see additional analysis in the Panel's [background note on the SRSG proposal](#).
- 117.** Including nexus funding from State donors, fragility financing from IFIs, and even humanitarian funds like the Central Emergency Response Fund and country-based pooled funds.
- 118.** International Financial Institutions have expressed concerns that establishing such mechanisms could create perverse incentives for States to drive or perpetuate displacement. It is worth noting, however, that the Panel has not seen evidence to substantiate these concerns.
- 119.** World Bank Group, [A Development Approach to Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement](#), 2021.
- 120.** The [Window for Host Communities and Refugees \(WHR\)](#) supports countries that host significant refugee populations to create medium- to long-term development opportunities for both the refugees and their host communities. This funding recognizes the significant challenge that these countries face in pursuing their own development goals while accommodating refugees, often in areas where local communities themselves lack basic services and resources.
- 121.** OECD, [DAC Nexus Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus](#), OECD/LEGAL/5019.
- 122.** Another resource that could be useful is the International Network on Conflict and Stability [Common Position on Comprehensive Solutions to Refugee Situations](#), which while focused on refugee contexts, also has important lessons for internal displacement settings. The INCAF Common Position is based on the OECD policy paper on [Financing for Refugee Situations](#), which outlines best practice principles on how financing, both in terms of quantity and quality, can promote solutions.
- 123.** As a representative from the Overseas Development Institute put it during one Panel consultation: "Too often UN and operational actors have been repackaging regular assistance, education or other activities as nexus approaches that contribute to peace. New collective durable solutions strategies offer opportunities for donors to hold actors to account for stronger peacebuilding outcomes."
- 124.** The Global Cities Fund for Inclusive Pandemic Response aims to respond to the unmet needs of cities supporting migrants, refugees IDPs as part of the cities' COVID-19 response, particularly in light of shrinking local government budgets. See [UN-Habitat works with Mayors Migration Council on fund for COVID-19 response to support migrants, refugees and IDPs](#), June 2021.
- 125.** The [Grand Bargain](#), launched in 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit, is a unique agreement between some of the largest donors and humanitarian organizations who have committed to get more resources into the hands of people in need and to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action.
- 126.** See the Panel's discussion paper on [Financing for Action on Internal Displacement](#) for additional information on some of the options the Panel explored.

127. See the [Global Partnership for Education's](#) website for more information.
128. See the [Global Financing Facility for Women, Children and Adolescents'](#) website for more information.
129. For more information, see [Prospects Partnership](#) and the [Lives in Dignity Grant Facility](#).
130. See additional analysis in [the summary of the Panel's roundtable on data](#).
131. The [Displacement Tracking Matrix](#) gathers and analyses data on the mobility, vulnerabilities and needs of displaced and mobile populations to enable decision makers and responders to provide these populations with better context-specific assistance.
132. In Colombia, for example, a monitoring system from the Department of Planning integrates data from the Victim's Registry and 49 different institutions to track progress against commitments and solutions.
133. In 2016, the UN Statistical Commission decided to establish an international Expert Group on Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons Statistics (EGRIS) comprised of participants drawn from national authorities and international statistical organizations as well as other technical experts. EGRIS was tasked with developing international recommendations, standards, and guidance to improve statistics on forced displacement.
134. The [International Recommendations on IDP Statistics](#) (IRIS) outline an internationally agreed framework for countries and international organizations to improve the production, coordination, and dissemination of high-quality official statistics on internally displaced persons that are consistent over time and comparable between regions and countries.
135. See for example the [UN Fundamental Principles on National Official Statistics](#). Many national and regional bodies have also developed guidelines and legal standards – see for example the European Union's [General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679](#) on data protection and privacy in the European Union (EU) and the European Economic Area (EEA).
136. For more information on data ethics and protection in displacement settings, see the IASC [Operational Guidance on Data Responsibility in Humanitarian Action](#); ICRC [Handbook on Data Protection in Humanitarian Action](#), and the materials produced by the [Humanitarian Data Science and Ethics Group](#).
137. This working group could complement the work of the humanitarian Information Management Working Group or UN Country Team Data Working Group where they are present.
138. During the immediate crisis phase, priority will need to be given to ensuring coordination of humanitarian data – including to promote common approaches and standards, maximize the use of open data wherever possible, and ensure strong safeguards and respect for data protection standards. As the situation begins to stabilize, additional attention should be directed to supporting Government data systems, including to elaborate policies and procedures for what information will be shared and how between international and national actors.
139. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) [defines](#) Big Data as “a paradigm for enabling the collection, storage, management, analysis and visualization, potentially under real-time constraints, of extensive datasets with heterogeneous characteristics.” This type of data could be used to understand macro trends relating to internal displacement.
140. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, [Record 50.8 million people displaced inside own countries by conflict, violence and disasters](#), IDMC GRID Press Release, Geneva, April 2020.
141. See Article 49 of [Fourth Geneva Convention](#), Article 17 of [Additional Protocol II](#), and [Rule 129](#) of the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Database.
142. See Article 7(1)(d) and Article 8(2)(a)(vii) of the [Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court](#), 1998.
143. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Reducing the humanitarian impact of the use of explosive weapons](#)

in populated areas, OCHA Policy and Studies Series, October 2017, p. 10.

144. UN Security Council, [Shame, Stigma Integral to Logic of Sexual Violence as War Tactic](#), Special Advisor Tells Security Council, as Speakers Demand Recognition for Survivors, coverage of the 7936th Security Council Meeting, SC/12819, May 2017, para 16.
145. UN Academic Impact, [UN-Secretary General Calls for Global Ceasefire to Focus on Ending the COVID-19 Pandemic](#), March 2020.
146. African Union, [Silencing the Guns: Creating Conducive Conditions for Africa's Development](#), 2020.
147. UN General Assembly Resolution 70/262 and UN Security Council Resolution 2282 (2016)
148. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, [NDC Synthesis Report](#), February 2021.
149. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, [Summary for Policymakers](#), 2021. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
150. World Bank, [Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration](#), 2018, p. 74. Additionally, in recognition of these risks, the [Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage](#) was adopted as part of the implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. It promotes comprehensive approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, including displacement.
151. About 35,000 people, or 47.4 per cent of Dominica's population, were displaced in 2017 by Hurricane Maria. IDMC, [Global Report on Internal Displacement 2018](#), p. 43.
152. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs on the prevention of arbitrary displacement in situations of armed conflict and generalized violence (forthcoming).
153. There are, however, notable exceptions: Afghanistan, Australia, France, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sudan, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States have adopted or are in the process of articulating policies on the protection of civilians.
154. Report of the UN Secretary-General, [Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict](#), S/2018/462, 2018, p. 16.
155. Inter-Agency Standing Committee, [Human Rights Up Front: An Overview](#), July 2015.
156. Seven years after the Sri Lanka Internal Review Panel Report that led to the creation of the Human Rights Up Front Initiative, another independent inquiry once again found there had been "systemic failure" in the UN to respond to widespread human rights violations – this time in Myanmar. See Gert Rosenthal, [A Brief and Independent Inquiry into the Involvement of the United Nations in Myanmar from 2010 to 2018](#), May 2019, p. 16.
157. The [Call to Action on Human Rights](#) is the successor to the Human Rights Up Front agenda and is an important opportunity to continue promoting a whole-of-UN approach to responding to threats to human rights – including in the most severe cases.
158. Samuel Cheung and Sebastian von Einsiedel, [Internal displacement: reflections on prevention, protection and solutions](#), Forced Migration Review, November 2020.
159. See the [Task Force on Displacement Report](#).
160. See [FAO's submission](#) to the Panel.
161. See IFRC's [Checklist on Law and Disaster Preparedness and Response](#) which shows how States can integrate internal displacement in disaster law.
162. Michelle Yonetani, [Mapping the Baseline: To What Extent are Displacement and Other Forms of Human Mobility Integrated in National and Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Strategies?](#), Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD), October 2018, p. 27. Research by the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent has also found that displacement, including due to climate-related risks, is also often absent or not adequately addressed in disaster laws. See International Federation of Red Cross, [Law and Disaster Preparedness](#)

and Response: Multi-Country Synthesis Report, Disaster Law Programme, November 2019, p. 69.

163. United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, [Words into Action, Engaging for resilience in support of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030](#), 2019.
164. IDMC, [Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019](#), p. 5.
165. Vanuatu: National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement, 2018; see also GP20, [Vanuatu Climate change and disaster-induced displacement policy](#), 2020 and IOM, [Vanuatu Displacement Management – Factsheet 2019](#).
166. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs, [Housing, Land and Property in the context of internal displacement](#), A/HRC/47/37, 21 May 2021.
167. International Organization for Migration and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, [Bridging the Divide in Approaches to Conflict and Disaster Displacement: Norms, Institutions and Coordination in Afghanistan, Colombia, the Niger, the Philippines and Somalia](#), 2021.
168. UNDP/ SOAS University of London, [Towards Development Solutions to Internal Displacement: A Political Economy Approach](#), June 2021.
169. Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the [OECD Development Assistance Committee](#) (DAC) as government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries. A portion of that ODA is directed to “fragile contexts,” namely countries that are experiencing a “combination of exposure to risk and insufficient coping capacity of the state, systems and/or communities to manage, absorb or mitigate those risks.” See additional information in the OECD’s Development Co-operation Working Paper on [States of Fragility and Official Development Assistance](#), 2020.
170. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is currently composed of 30 member States representing most of the world’s largest development donors. See [DAC Member List](#).
171. OECD DAC, [Trends and Insights on Development Finance](#), 2019, p. 9.
172. Government of Colombia, [Law no 387](#), 1997 (in Spanish).
173. Government of Colombia, [Early Warning website](#) (in Spanish).
174. See additional detail in the Panel’s discussion paper on [Financing for Action on Internal Displacement](#).
175. The [Green Climate Fund](#) was established to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries and to help vulnerable societies adapt to the unavoidable impacts of climate change. It is the world’s largest fund dedicated to addressing climate change.
176. See the [Platform on Disaster Displacement \(PDD\) submission](#) for additional information.
177. IFRC and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre, [Forecast-based Financing and Disaster Displacement](#), Issue Brief, 2020; and GP20, [Mongolia: Forecast-Based Financing to Avoid Disaster Displacement](#), 2020.
178. Some Governments – particularly Small Island Developing States – have also expressed an understandable frustration that they are consistently asked to use their own scarce funds to respond to displacement and disasters linked to climate change they had little part in creating.
179. Analysis by ACAPS found that in 2020, IDPs and crisis-affected populations in more than 60 countries were not receiving the humanitarian assistance they needed because of access constraints. See ACAPS, [Humanitarian Access Overview](#), December 2020, p. 2.
180. These protection breakdowns have been widely documented by both UN and external evaluations. In a [UN Board of Inquiry report](#) after one particularly stark incident in South Sudan, the evaluators found that the UN Mission had failed “at all levels” to respond effectively to the threat, ultimately “ensuring that civilians would be placed in serious risk in the very location to which they had come for protection”.
181. An evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan response in the Philippines found, for example, that “The inter-agency surge did deliver an effective

response, but one that sidelined many in-country staff, failed to adequately join up with national systems, and ended up creating parallel structures for planning and coordination.” For more detail see [Leaving No One Behind – Humanitarian effectiveness in the age of the Sustainable Development Goals](#), OCHA, 2016.

182. As one submission to the Panel put it: “The short time-frames and tendency to bypass municipal authorities and local systems were seen as at best inefficient, and at worst as actively undermining longer-term, sustainable improvements to the well-being of IDPs and urban poor alike. Less visibly, but no less damaging, there are well-documented instances of such piece-meal programming eroding population’s faith in the capacities and relevance of their own local governments.” See Karen Büscher and Koen Vlassenroot, [Humanitarian presence and urban development: new opportunities and contrasts in Goma, DRC](#), Disasters, March 2010.
183. Mark Lowcock, [What’s wrong with the humanitarian aid system and how to fix it](#), April 2021.
184. According to OCHA’s [Financial Tracking Service](#), the Humanitarian appeals and response plans were funded at 49.7% in 2020, 63.5% in 2019, 60.7% in 2018, 61.3% in 2017 and 60.5% in 2016, – i.e., a shortfall of over 40 per cent between global humanitarian needs and available funds over the last five years.
185. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, [Global Humanitarian Overview](#), 2021.
186. High-Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, [Too important to fail – addressing the humanitarian financing gap](#), 2016.
187. See more information on [the IASC Grand Bargain’s official website](#).
188. Under some jurisdictions, essential humanitarian activities such as the provision of medical care to wounded and sick members of non-State armed groups designated as ‘terrorist’, or aid delivery in areas controlled by such groups, may be criminalized or exposed to heavy fines. The legal, financial and reputational risks incurred have led private sector entities whose services are necessary in the aid delivery chain to cease providing such services to humanitarian organizations in high-risk contexts, or impose exorbitant conditions. There has been increasing concern over donors’ zero-risk policy regarding aid diversion to non-State armed groups they consider ‘terrorist’ or otherwise sanctioned, with, for example, grant clauses requiring extensive vetting of partners or beneficiaries. These could actively associate humanitarian actors to the implementation of a political and military agenda, and could result in excluding persons entitled to humanitarian assistance from humanitarian programmes.
189. Kate Mackintosh and Patrick Duplat, [Study of the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action](#), OCHA/NRC, July 2013, p. 69.
190. International Committee of the Red Cross, [Pathways to durable solutions: bolstering interim solutions to internal displacement](#), 2021.
191. The Participation Revolution is an initiative within the humanitarian community to include the people affected by humanitarian crises in decisions that affect them to ensure the humanitarian response is relevant, timely, effective and efficient. See more on the [Participation Revolution](#) website.
192. The Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework is a new approach to analyzing the multiple needs of populations in crisis. It was introduced into the Humanitarian Programme Cycle in 2020 and involves analyzing the context, events, shock, impact and humanitarian conditions in any given country, in order to give a holistic overview of how a population has been affected, and the severity and magnitude of their needs. See more on the [Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework website](#).
193. Humanitarian Response Plans articulate a vision for in-country humanitarian action, the strategy for achieving that vision, the actions to be taken to implement the strategy, as well as agreement on the monitoring of the collective response. See more on [Humanitarian Response Plans here](#).
194. In Mogadishu, for example, the World Food Programme worked with the Benadir Regional Authority to deliver cash to IDP families through

an Urban Safety Net Programme. See [Somalia Annual Country Report 2020](#).

195. This was a key commitment from the World Humanitarian Summit and there has been steady progress since that time.

196. See Filipa Schmitz Guinote, [ICRC and the “humanitarian–development–peace nexus” discussion](#), *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol.101, number 912, p.1059.

197. See the [Transformative Agenda](#), the [Cluster Coordination Reference Module](#) and the [Handbook for the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator](#).

198. IASC, [Guidance on Strengthening Participation, Representation and Leadership of Local and National Actors in IASC Humanitarian Coordination Mechanisms](#), July 2021.

199. See the [letter](#) by Member States calling for the creation of the Panel.

200. [Secretary-General’s statement announcing the establishment of a High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement](#), 23 October 2019.

201. See the [Terms of Reference of the High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement](#).

202. UNGA [Resolution 46/182](#). IDPs are not specifically mentioned in the Resolution but are included implicitly. The resolution came about after the UN reviewed its capacity to provide assistance to those in need. The review found that most of those in need were displaced within States and hence the requirement in the

resolution that humanitarian assistance would, ‘in principle’, be provided with the consent of the State concerned.

203. The UN Commission on Human Rights unanimously adopted a resolution taking note of the [Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement](#).

204. See the [World Summit Outcome adopted by the General Assembly](#) on 16 September 2005, para 132. The General Assembly has reaffirmed this language at least eight times since then, and the Human Rights Council at least five times.

205. See the [IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons](#), April 2010.

206. See the [2011 Policy Committee decision](#).

207. See the [International Recommendations on IDP Statistics](#) and the [GP20 Compilation of National Practices](#).

208. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, [Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development](#), 2015, para 23.

209. See, for example, Council of Europe [Recommendation 6](#) of the Committee of Ministers to Member States (2006); Organization of American States [Resolution 2850](#) on IDPs (2014); and League of Arab States Resolution 761 (2016).



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